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THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF THE PERSISTENT
PESTICIDES: A LESSON IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.*
On April 4, 1969 the United States Food & Drug Administration
announced the seizure of 28,000 pounds of Lake Michigan coho salmon
containing quantities of DDT in excess of established tolerance levels.' In
response to the public outcry which followed, Robert H. Finch, Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, acting in the tradition of the beleagured public
official, on April 21, announced the formation of a Secretary's Commission
on Pesticides and Their Relationship to Environmental Health. 2 Dr. Emil
Mrak, chancellor emeritus of the University of California at Davis, accepted
the chairmanship of the body, which was charged generally with exploring the
"field of environmental pollution and its consequent risks to our citizens."'3
Among its members were governmental officials, representatives of the pesti-
cides industry and university scientists.
A 44-page summary of the fourteen Mrak Commission recommendations
was released by Secretary Finch at a press conference on November 12,
1969.4 On December 23, 1969 he released the complete report of the Com-
mission and announced immediate steps to implement several of the recom-
mendations.6 In sum, the Mrak Commission has urged corrective action that
would (1) strengthen controls over the registration of chemical pesticides,
(2) reorganize the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, (3) im-
prove the administration of laws regulating the release of chemical pesticides
into the environment and the food supply, and (4) encourage various initia-
tives to prevent further environmental contamination by pesticide residues.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B., Harvard University
1961; LL.B., Columbia University, 1965. The author is petitioner in the case described
in note 218 infra.
1. See Press Release, United States Food & Drug Administration April, 4, 1969.
2. Statement of Secretary Robert H. Finch, April 21, 1969.
3. Id. at 1.
4. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON
PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: RECOMMENDATION
AND SUMMARIES pt. I (1969) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY].
5. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON
PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, REPORT, pts. I & II(1969) [hereinafter cited as AIRx. REPORT].
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Unquestionably, the Mrak Commission report will be highly influential
in determining the direction of federal pesticides policy in future years. This
article will present an interpretation and criticism of the Commission's con-
clusions, with a special emphasis on the treatment and relevance of the DDT
issue. Each of the fourteen recommendations will be reviewed where relevant
to the four major goals set forth above. The crucial and often decisive role
of the law as a lever for reform, as a catalyst for transmitting scientific
information to the political decision-maker and as a medium for planning to
protect against the effects of pesticides pollution on the environment and the
population will be emphasized. Obstacles to reform, including the rigidity of
governmental agencies and the shortsightedness of industry, will be identified
and evaluated.
Some of the Mrak Commission recommendations reflect sound policy
judgments, while others give cause for concern. Although evaluation of these
recommendations is important, it should also be remembered that the Com-
mission's repeated acknowledgement that "corrective action"'0 is necessary
constitutes no assurance that its proposals will be implemented. The recom.
mendations are sufficiently abstract to make implementation dependent upon a
renewed commitment by officials who have been less than energetic in ful-
filling their responsibilities. In addition, much of the constructive content of
the report is only a reiteration of proposals that have been advanced-to no
avail-by other distinguished bodies in recent years.7 That still another study
was deemed necessary demonstrates the continued rigidity of the forces
opposing effective regulation of chemical pesticides.
The story of the persistent pesticides8 is an increasingly familiar one of
technology run amok. We have had similar experiences with strontium 90,
carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, chemical detergents and countless other
products of an industrial society.9 We will doubtless confront similar challenges
in the future in the form of new contributions to air, water and noise pollution.
At stake ultimately is whether civilized man is capable of controlling, through
law, his modern technology which, while bestowing great gains on the one
hand, degradates his environment and threatens his biology on the other. The
lesson of the persistent pesticides on this score is instructive, urgent and
grotesque.
Additional legal action before the legislatures, agencies and courts is both
timely and essential to secure a measure of protection for man and his environ-
ment. Like other disciplines, the legal profession has been lax in attempting to
6. MRAK REPORT 5.
7. See notes 89-96 infra and accompanying text.
8. Though many pesticides have qualities of persistence, the chlorinated hydrocarbons
have acquired the greatest notoriety. Among these, the most widely used are DDT,
dieldrin, endrin, aldrin, chlordance, toxaphene, lindane and heptachlor.
9. See B. CommoNtR, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL (1966).
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halt the accelerating degradation of our physical environment. Unlike most
disciplines, however, the legal profession is uniquely situated and thoroughly
trained to do something about the problem. Experience has demonstrated that
novel legal initiatives, notably the Wisconsin DDT hearings,'0 have been in-
strumental in the current assault against the persistent pesticides.
I. STRENGTHENING CONTROLS OVER THE REGISTRATION
OF CHEMICAL PESTICIDES
Recommendation L Initiate closer cooperation among the De-
partments of Health, Education and Welfare, Agriculture and In-
terior on pesticide problems through establishment of a new in-
teragency agreement.
A. The Statutory Framework
The registration of chemical pesticides is now in the exclusive domain of
the Secretary of Agriculture under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA)." The particulars of the legislation deserve mention,
though they bear scant relationship to the realities of regulation in the pesti-
cides world. Any product termed an "economic poison," otherwise defined as a
chemical pesticide, must be registered before it may be marketed in interstate
commerce. 12 The act forbids the sale of adulterated, misbranded or improperly
labelled pesticides.' 3 Misbranding results if the labeling, among other de-
ficiencies, fails to supply prominently placed directions which are adequate for
the protection of the public; or if the product when used as directed or in
accordance with commonly recognized practice causes injury to man or other
non-target species.' 4 Provisions for the cancellation of a registration, upon
thirty days notice, are included.' 5 Violations may be punished criminally.' 6 In
addition, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is authorized
to institute court proceedings for the seizure and disposition of products which
are adulterated, misbranded or unregistered.' 7 Also revelant to the statutory
scheme are the pesticide chemical provisions of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act, which require the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
to establish tolerances in the event a registered use of an economic poison will
result in residues in food products.'
Manifestly, the Secretaries of HEW and Interior (USDI) are given no
statutory responsibility for determining what chemical pesticides will be reg-
10. See Wurster, The Wisconsin DDT Hearings, 19 Blo-ScrmNcE 809 (1969).
11. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1964).
12. 7 U.S.C. § 135b (1964).
13. 7 U.S.C. § 135a(5) (1964).
14. 7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (1964).
15. 7 U.S.C. § 135b (1964).
16. 7 U.S.C. § 135f (1964).
17. 7 U.S.C. § 135g (1964).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1964).
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istered for what uses. Their participation in the registration process is
advisory only, pursuant to an Interagency Agreement entered into with the
Secretary of Agriculture in 1964 and rewritten in March of this year.10 Pro-
testations by HEW or USDI that a chemical pesticide may present a hazard to
human health or contaminate the environment cannot bar the registration of the
chemical by the Secretary of Agriculture. In practice, during the last five years
hundreds of pesticide products have been registered for use over the objections
of HEW.20 Acknowledging the problem, the Mrak Commission recommends
that "approval by the Secretaries of HEW and Interior as well as Agricul-
ture . ..be required for all pesticide registrations."2'
B. Comment
Wresting exclusive control over the process of registering chemical pesti-
cides from the USDA should be a sine qua non for those interested in en-
forcing the Mrak Commission recommendations. No other single proposal
has greater long range implications. Degradation of the environment by ir-
responsible and myopic bureaucracies is a phenemenon that has become dis-
tressingly familiar.22 It has inspired proposals for legislative reform.23 But the
experience with the chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides is without parallel in il-
lustrating dramatically the disastrous course that may be followed by the single-
track agency, here the USDA, operating on functional lines and responsive to
special interests, heedless of the impact of its policies on the population at large
and the total environment.
Decisions regarding the registration of chemical pesticides obviously affect
the nation's fundamental needs to produce food, preserve its natural resources
and protect the health of its population. To be sure, farm groups, food pro-
ducers and the manufacturers of agricultural chemicals, strongly represented in
USDA and its state counterparts, have an intense interest in securing speedy
registrations authorizing the use of cheap, effective chemical pesticides. The
agricultural chemicals industry, which was insignificant at the close of World
War II, now has domestic sales well in excess of a billion dollars annually and,
consequently, represents concerns fundamental to our agricultural economy.24
19. The 1964 Agreement is reproduced in COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, INTERAGENCY
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS COORDINATION: PESTICIDES AND PUBLIC POLICY, S. REp. No.
1379, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41 (1966) [hereinafter cited as RIBicorl REPORT]. The
new Agreement appears in 35 Fed. Reg. 4014 (March 3, 1970).
20. See HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, DEFICIENCIES nIr ADMINISTRATION OF
THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE AND RODENTICIDE ACT, H.R. RP. No. 637, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DEFICIENCIES REPORT].
21. MRAK REPORT 7.
22. See text accompanying notes 200-207 infra.
23. See Mich. H.B. 3055 (1969) (drafted by Professor Joseph L. Sax).
24. Compare G. C. BLOOM & S. E. DEGLER, PESTICIDES AND POLLUTION 2 (1969)
with DEFICIENCIES REPORT at 21 and MaxK REPORT at 46, 227. See Rohrman, The Law of
Pesticides: Present and Future, 17 J. PUB. L. 351, 355 n.11 (1968), for a discussion of
the evolution of pesticides manufacturing.
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No less obvious, however, is the interest in pesticides of environmental groups
and the USDI, which through the Fish and Wildlife Service is responsible for
protecting wildlife and their habitats from the debilitating effects of chemical
compounds. And the indisputable health hazards posed by the widespread use
of pesticides unequivocally establish the interest of the medical, community
and HEW, acting hrough the Food & Drug Administration and the Public
Health Service, in deciding what formulations will be registered for what uses.
Our experience with chemical pesticides has afforded the American people
lasting insights into the complex interrelationships between the various com-
ponents of the world's ecosystems and the need to coordinate governmental
responses to control activity that disregards established jurisdictional lines.
The sobering aspect of the experience lies not so much in the fact that the risk
was confronted, but rather that it was confronted before it was fully under-
stood. Opening the registration process to non-agricultural points of view and
insights is essential to the development of sound predictive judgments that will
minimize similiar environmental catastrophes.25
The Mrak Commission's view that a new Interagency Agreement would
be sufficient to strengthen cooperative action among the Departments26 ignores
inevitable deficiencies in the administration of interagency agreements and
overlooks legal and political realities. To accomplish reform in the registra-
tion process and the other statutory obligations, FIFRA should be amended
specifically to assure participation by HEW and USDI. Legal responsibilities
should be articulated clearly in this legislation, giving each department the
power to veto proposed registrations, supervise labeling obligations and ini-
tiate cancellation proceedings. It is time to rewrite the basic pesticides legisla-
tion which, in significant respects, has remained unchanged since the Insecti-
cide Act of 1910,27 a statute that was hardly a monument to environmental
concern.
Present administrative realities further accentuate the urgency of 'legis-
lative reform. That USDA, acting through the Pesticides Regulation Division
(PRD), has been scandalously derelict in enforcing FIFRA is manifest. The
details and extent of this betrayal of the public interest have been documented
thoroughly by a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions.28 Pesticide products have been approved for use without compliance with
established interdepartmental procedures for resolving safety questions. Pro-
ducts have been approved for uses that were practically certain to result in the
25. On the need for making before-the-fact judgments about the .possible adverse
effects of new technology, see Baldwin, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, CONFR NCE ON
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1969 (unpublished paper on file at The Conservation
Foundation, Washington, D.C.).
26. See MRAx REPORT 8.
27. 36 Stat. 331 (1910).
28. See Deficiencies In Administration of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comnz. on Gov't Operations, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as Deficiencies Hearings].
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illegal adulteration of food. Labels approved for registration have failed to in-
form users of possible hazards and provide accurate directions. Actions to can-
cel registered products have been long delayed and slipshod; indeed, according
to the house committee, PRD never has secured the cancellation of a registra-
tion in a contested case. After completion of uncontested cancellation pro-
ceedings, hazardous products have remained in marketing channels for years.
Despite numerous and repeated violations, not a single case has been referred
to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. And PRD officials
have appointed consultants to positions in which their duties presented a clear
conflict of interest with their private employer in the pesticides industry. In
one celebrated instance Dr. Roy T. Hansberry, an official of one of Shell
Chemical Company's affiliates, was appointed to a task force examining criteria
applied by PRD to determine whether pesticide registration applications should
be approved. 29 In short, enforcement of the central legislation for regulating
chemical pesticides has been undermined by administrative ineptitude, indif-
ference and corruption; the public interest has been grossly ignored to the
distinct advantage of the chemical pesticides industry.
Under the circumstances, it is encouraging that Secretary Finch has
affirmed publicly that HEW must have "clearly defined" authority to intervene
against registered uses of pesticides deemed to be hazardous to the health of
man or other living organisms upon which life depends.30 It is discouraging,
however, that this clear definition of authority apparently is to be found not in
new legislation but in a renovated version of the Interagency Agreement,
which, as recently revised, prescribes elaborate procedures for consultation
and review of pesticide registrations by representatives of HEW, USDI and
USDA.31
Rehabilitating FIFRA by simply rewriting the Argeement is impossible.
First, no interdepartmental agreement can override the specific provisions
of the legislation which vests sole responsibility for registration in the Sec-
retary of Agriculture, who has not done the job. Second, experience demon-
strates that compliance under any interagency agreement is likely to be
haphazard and incomplete. The former agreement specifically required that
in the event of a difference of opinion among departmental representatives the
matter would be referred directly to the secretary responsible for final action.
29. Understandably, this' particular Task Force recommended that the primary re-
sponsibility for registering pesticide chemicals should remain with USDA, the other
federal agencies serving only in an advisory capacity. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
THE PESTICIDES REGuLAT ON DIVIsioN 34 (November, 1965), reproduced as App. 6 in
Deficiencies Hearings 248-96. This task force also chastized the Public Health Service
for failing'to support objections on health grounds with appropriate scientific evidence,
id. at 33, an obligation imposed by the Interagency Agreement, but one clearly contra-
vening statutory requirements that the applicant sustain the burden of presenting adequate
evidence of safety. See DEF IcrENcIES REPORT 39.
30. Statement of Secretary Finch of December 23, 1969.
31. 35 Fed. Reg. 4014 (farch 3; 1970).
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Not a single one of the more than 1600 objections made by HEW was referred
to the Secretary of Agriculture.32 The annual general conference of depart-
mental representatives, prescribed by paragraph 3 of the old agreement and
paragraph 10 of the new, has never been held.3 3 Other instances of lack of
cooperation, immaturity and irresponsibility abound.34 It is unjustifiably
sanguine to assume that those responsible for nullifying the old agreement
will administer the revised version to accomplish significant reform in the reg-
ulation of chemical pesticides.
In short, the Interagency Agreement, in conception and operation, invites
the administrator to evade his responsibility, amidst uncertain guidelines, to the
detriment of the public. Continuation of the loose informality of this arrange-
ment leaves too much room for "business as usual" administration by officials
whose combined efforts to regulate the use of chemical pesticides to date have
been deplorable. Bringing the delinquents to- book and reinstating a sensible
pattern of administration can be accomplished with certainty only by rewriting
FIFRA to give HEW and USDI significant enforcement responsibilities.
Clear guidelines, helpful to administrators, are equally beneficial to the outsider
who may be inclined to intervene to enforce legislative or administrative
standards. 35
Legislative reform of the registration process should be implemented
promptly. The process of educating the public, inaugurated in 1962 by Rachel
Carson,3 0 is now largely realized. The DDT issue is a cause cglbre, widely
covered in the press.37 Public opinion is inflamed-and deservedly so-about
the mounting evidence of environmental contamination and the growing sus-
picion that DDT threatens human health. The climate for wholesale reform of
the registration process will never be better. Opportunism is a part of good
politics. It is the key to legal reform. The elimination of DDT and its close
relatives, without more, will not assure effective long run supervision of the
sale and use of all chemical pesticides, now numbering some 900 compounds
in 45,000 separate products. 38 The dangers will be further multiplied as the
production and use of pesticides in the United States continues to grow in
response to local and foreign demands.3 9 The opportunity to protect the Ameri-
32. See DEFICIENCIES REPORT 36.
33. Id. at 37.
34. See REPORT OF THE TAsK FORCE ON THE, PESTIcIDES REGULATION DIVISION,
supra note 29, at 30-34.
35. See text accompanying notes 218-25 infra, discussing the leverage afforded by
the Delaney amendment.
36. THE SILENT SPRING (1962).
37. E.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1969, at'4, col. 2 ("Evidence of the present system's
inadequacy surfaced three weeks ago when the Agriculture Department disclosed that
for almost a month it had been investigating heptachlor epoxide contamination of tur-
keys, most of them originally destined for the nation's Thanksgiving tables").
38. See DEFICrENCIES REPORT 21.
39. Surveys and reports of government and industrial economists indicate that
synthetic organic pesticide production is increasing at approximately an annual
rate of 15 per cent with an indication of more than $3- billion sales by 1975. This
1970]
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can public against a repetition of the DDT experience, which is now present,
must be exploited.
Recommendation III. Eliminate within two years all uses of
DDT and DDD in the United States, excepting those uses essential
to the preservation of human health or welfare and approved un-
animously by the Secretaries of the Departments of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, Agriculture, and Interior.
Recommendation IV. Restrict the Usage of certain persistent
pesticides in the United States to specific essential uses which create
no known hazard to human health or the quality of the environment
and which are unanimously approved by the Secretaries of the De-
partments of Health, Education and Welfare, Agriculture, and In-
terior.
A. Patterns of Use
These recommendations to restrict the use of certain persistent pesticides
should be assessed in the context of a brief discussion of the evolution of the
DDT crisis. DDT was not used widely as a chemical pesticide until World War
11.40 Its reputation was established quickly as a miracle insecticide, effective in
controlling the carriers of many dreaded tropical diseases, including malaria,
typhus and yellow fever. In 1948 the Swiss chemist who discovered its broad
insecticidal properties was awarded the Nobel prize.41 After the war, domestic
use of DDT in the United States rose steadily as the chemical proved its
utility for public health purposes and in controlling agricultural, home garden
and forest pests. Its cheapness, low toxicity to the applicator, broad spectrum
effect, and persistence combined to produce what was thought to be an ideal
general purpose insecticide. Optimists predicted that all major insect pests
would be eradicated by this extraordinary chemical.42 Production, domestic use
and exports of DDT increased throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, reaching
a peak of 188 million pounds in the 1962-63 season.43 During recent years,
however, the use of DDT has decreased, a pattern duplicated, with some
variations, by its close relatives, dieldrin, aldrin, and heptachlor. 44 It is esti-
is in contrast to increases of approximately 37 percent for the 5-year period,
1963 to 1967. The total dollar value of all pesticides produced in this country was
$440 million in 1964; this has increased to $12 billion in 1969 .... Predictions are
that insecticides will more than double in use by 1975 to more than $600 million
while herbicide uses will increase to more than double that of insecticides ($1-1p.
billion) during that same period.
MRAK, REPORT 46-47.
40: Sources on usage include R. RUDD, PESTICIDES AND THE LIVING LANDScAPE
(1964); COMM. oN PERSISTENT PESTICIDES, DivisioN OF BIOLOGY AND ARIC,, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (1969) [hereinafter cited as
the JENSEN ComMIITEE REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE,
AGRICULTURAL EcoNomic REPORT No. 158: DDT USED IN FARM PRODUCTION (1969)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT ON DDT UsE] ; MRAic REPORT 46-97.
41. See NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE AssocIATION, INC., THE WORLD ALMANAC 453
(1970).
42. MRAY REPORT 46.
43. REPORT on DDT USE 2.
44. JENSEN Coumrr=a REPORT 6.
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mated that DDT presently represents approximately 15% of the total agricul-
tural poisons used in the United States.45 Exports claim around 70% of the
United States total production and are used primarily for malaria control in
underdeveloped nations.46 Worldwide production totals are unknown,47 but use
is increasing rapidly as the agriculture in developing countries adopts new
chemical control techniques.48 Domestically, farmers are the major users,
accounting for perhaps two-thirds of the consumption.49 Present high use field
crops include tobacco, cotton, peanuts, corn, wheat and hay.50 Other crops
significantly affected by recent use restrictions include apples, potatoes, onions,
apricots, peas, strawberries, cherries and raspberries. 51
The reasons for the dwindling domestic use of DDT are several. 52 The
development of resistant strains of insects, now numbering some 89 species, 53
has eroded its effectiveness. Cheaper, more dependable alternatives are now
commercially available. Primitive notions of controlling insect populations
through massive spray programs have been displaced by thinking which em-
phasizes the need for integrated control measures, combining chemical appli-
cations with biological and other control techniques, including the introduction
of insect diseases, predators, and sex sterilization5 4 Perhaps most important
has been the gradually increasing awareness by the general public and govern-
mental officials that DDT and related persistent pesticides have been one of
the world's most serious pollution problems. What staggers the imagination
about DDT is that decisive action to restrict its use was so long delayed.
B. The Scientific Evidence: The Gathering Storm
Given the scientific complexities of the DDT issue, adducing the evidence
in any forum truly requires an interdisciplinary venture. The case against
the persistent pesticides has been recorded in the professional journals in
the form of contributions from the fields of botany, pharmacology, ecology,
entomology, chemistry, marine biology, pathology, economics and political
45. See MacDougall, Summation of the Session on General Aspects of Pesticide Use,
160 ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK AcAn. OF SCIENCES 69 (1969).
46. REPORT ON DDT USE 2.
47. JENSEN CoMmrTrEE REPORT 7.
48. MRAK REPORT 55-56.
49. REPORT ON DDT UsE 2.
50. Id. at 3.
51. These crops were mentioned at the Washington DDT hearings, held before the
State Director of Agriculture in Seattle on October 14-16, by witnesses opposing the
proposed ban, including representatives of Del Monte Corp., Washington Growers Clear-
ing House, Inland Empire Pea Growers Ass'n Washington Ass'n of Dry Pea & Lentil
Producers, Hop Growers of Washington, Washington State Seed Ass'n, Washington
Potatoe Comm'n, Federal Stone Fruit Marketing Committee and the North Central
Washington Fieldman's Ass'n.
52. See JENSEN CommMirEE REPORT 7.
53. See MRAK REPORT 59.




science, to name but prime examples.5 The Mrak Commission reviewed over
5000 references.5 6 What follows is a summary of the accepted scientific publica-
tions, interpreted, of course, from a legal point of view.
Unique biological and chemical properties combine to create DDT's extra-
ordinary pollution potential.57 It is a persistent chemical, having a half-life in
some environments of up to 15 years. It has extraordinary mobility and may
be transported by air and water from the original place of application through-
out the world's ecosystems." Within a single day, pesticides applied on the
southern plains of Texas have been carried by dust particles to Cincinnati,
Ohio.59 Because it is a fat soluble, DDT is concentrated in living systems and
passed along through food chains. Consequently, a bird at the top of the food
pyramid may accumulate quantities of the chemical thousands of times in ex-
cess of the traces found in the lower organisms upon which it feeds.00 The Lake
Michigan coho, at the top of the food chain, were victimized by this process of
biological magnification. It is this lethal combination of qualities-persistence,
mobility, solubility in fat and toxicity-which distinguishes DDT as a pollutant
almost without parallel.
The scientific documentation, which has been accumulating for many
years, supplies the dimensions of our present predicament. It has been esti-
mated that one billion pounds of DDT are circulating through the world's
water and air supply. 1 Traces of the chemical have been found in penguins
in the Antarctic,6  Eskimos in the arctic, 63 and in tuna in the mid-Pacific.0 4
In 1963 the President's Science Advisory Committee reported that 20 tons of
DDT residue were stored in the bodies of the people of the United States, an
average of approximately one tenth of a gram per person. 65 Residues have been
detected in the body tissues of people throughout the world 5
55. The Mrak Report contains a complete bibliography following each subcom-
mittee report.
56. See MRAK REPORT 5.
57. E.g., Wurster, Chlorinated Hydrocarbon Insecticides and the World Ecosystem,
2 BIOLOGICAL CONSEaVAnTON 123 (1969); Wurster, The Wisconsin DDT Hearings, 19
BIo-ScrENcE 809 (1969).
58. E.g., Antomaria et al., Airborne Particulates in Pittsburgh: Association with p,p-DDT, 150 SCIENCE 1476 (1965); Risebrough, Polychlorinated Biphenyls in Global
Ecosystems, 220 NATURE 1098 (1968).
59. Cohen & Pinkerton, Widespread Translocation of Pesticides by Air Transport
and Rain-Out, in AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY, ORGANIC PESTICIDES IN THE ENVIRON-
MENT 163 (1966).
60. E.g., Woodwell et al., DDT Residues in an East Coast Estuary: A Case of
Biological Concentration of a Persistent Insectcid , 156 SCIENCE 821 (1967) ; MRAIC
REPORT 186-89.
61. Woodwell, Radioactivity and Fallout: The Model Pollution, N.Y. BOTANICAL
GARDEN J. (1968). See Niering, The Effects of Pesticides, 18 BIO-SCIENCE 869 n.1 (1963).
62. Tatton & Ruzicka, Organochlorine Pesticides in Antartica, 215 NATURE 346(1967).
63. Durham et al., Insecticide Content of Diet and Body Fat of Alaskan Natives, 134
SCIENCE 1880 (1961).
64. See R. Risebrough, Chlorinated Hydrocarbons in Marine Ecosystems, (ms. on
file with author).
65. See 1963 PREsiDENT'S SCIENCE ADvIsoRY Comm,. REP., USE OF PESTCxDES 6[hereinafter cited as USE OF PESTICIES].
66. See MRAK REPoRT 319-24.
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The toxicity of this widely disseminated pesticide upon non-target organ-
isms also has been thoroughly documented. The rare Bermuda petrel, which
does not venture within hundreds of miles of a major land mass, has suffered
significant reproductive setbacks. 67 In recent years, peregrine falcons 68 and
brown pelicans,60 among others, have suffered ominous reductions in nesting
successes. Our national symbol, the bald eagle, is threatened with extinction. °
Numerous other species of birds, notably the carnivores, are affected simi-
larly.71
DDT is widely distributed in marine environment. Quantities in the
oceans will continue to intensify for many years.72 A recent report by the
United States Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife disclosed that residues
were found in 584 of 590 samples of fish taken from 45 rivers and lakes in the
United States.73 Marine biologists consider the chlorinated hydrocarbon
pesticides to be the most serious form of water pollution.7 - For several years
and with increasing vehemency public agencies responsible for preserving fish
life and their habitats have spoken out against further use of the persistent
chemicals.75 Fish kills due to isolated pesticide episodes, though significant,7 6
do not disclose the gravity of the possible long-range consequences. Minute,
sub-lethal doses of DDT can produce significant reproductive setbacks in cer-
tain species.7 7 One reputable study has concluded that DDT also slows down
photosynthesis in marine plant life,78 thus interfering with the fundamental
chemical process by which green plants absorb the sun's energy and make it
available to all living things.
Whether the persistent pesticides pose a threat to human health is still an
open question. It is indisputable, however, that the quantities stored in human
beings would not be tolerated in the food supply.7 9 Incredibly, nursing mothers,
67. Wurster & Wingate, DDT Residues and Declining Reproduction in the Bermuda
Petrel, 159 SCIENCE 979 (1968).
68. See J. HicyEy, PEREGRINE FALcON POPULATIONS: THEIR BIOLOGY AND DECLINE(1969).
69. Open Letter to Governor Ronald Reagan and the People of-the State of California,
signed by 62 marine scientists, 115 Cong. Rec. S9182, S9183 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1969);
see MRAK REPORT 211.
70. Postupolsky, Eagles and Pesticides (Department of Wildlife Ecology, University
of Wisconsin, April 22, 1969) (unpublished document); 115 CoNG. REc. S6306 (daily
ed. June 12, 1969).
71. The mechanism by which the persistent pesticides cause reproductive failures is
now known: "DDE, a metabolite of DDT, induces the formation of enzymes which break
down steroid hormones. The latter, among other things, control calcium metabolism in
birds. The resulting calcium imbalance has led to production of eggs with thin or flaking
shells." Postupolsky, supra note 70; see J. HICKEY, supra note 68, passimn.
72. MRAK REPORT 239.
73. See 115 Cong. Rec. 6142 (June 9, 1969).
74. See Open Letter, supra note 69.
75. See, e.g., Ribicoff Hearings pt. I, 69 (Statement of the Honorable Stuart Udall).
76. See, e.g., 1968 FED. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN. REP. ON POLLUTION-
CAUSED FISH KILLS.
77. See Macek, Reproductions in Brook Trout (Salvelinus fontinalls) Fed Sublethal
Concentrations of DDT, 25 J. FISH. RES. BD. CANADA 1787 (1968).
78. Wurster, DDT Reduces Photosynthesis by Marine Phytoplankton, 159 SCIENCE
1474 (1968);
79. The estimated concentration of DDT in the human population of 12 parts per
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who must make extraordinary demands upon their body fats, transmit to their
children doses of DDT well in excess of the acceptable daily intake set by the
World Health Organization."0
The Mrak Commission concludes "that present levels of exposure to DDT
[as well as dieldrin] among the general population have not produced any ob-
servable adverse effect in controlled studies on volunteers."3' On the other
hand, the Commission concedes that recently conducted animal experiments
have produced disturbing findings.82 It was reported at a scientific conference
at Corvallis, Oregon, in August, 1969, that high concentrations of DDT caused
physiological damage to the kidneys, liver and nerves of the affected test ani-
mals.8 3 High residues of DDT have been associated with certain diseases in
human beings such as cancer, hypertension and liver disease.84 Only last year
a study sponsored by the American Cancer Institute disclosed that DDT and
other pesticides caused tumors in mice,85 a conclusion with significant legal
consequences.8 6 Of this study the Mrak Commission says, "with the evidence
now in, DDT can be regarded neither as a proven danger as a carcinogen for
man nor as an assuredly safe pesticide; suspicion has been aroused and it
should be confirmed or dispelled." 87 It is no answer to this evidence to argue
that research as yet fails to demonstrate that the chemical pesticides stored in
our body tissue is harmful to the species. At the very least, subjecting the en-
tire population to a scientific experiment of unknown consequences is inexcus-
able.
C. The Analytical Framework: Posing the Issues
Though the documentation is extensive and disturbing, justifying legal
prohibitions against the persistent pesticides requires evidence of another kind.
million is well in excess of Food & Drug Administration tolerance levels for DDT in
many food products. Compare UsE OF PESTICIDES, supra note 65, at 6 with 33 Fed. Reg.
2787 (1968). It should be remembered, however, that "tolerance" is often "erroneously
interpreted to indicate the maximum level of intake which can be safely tolerated in a
physiological sense, whereas the term, as used in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, defines
a legal limit based on the minimum requirement resulting from technological use, and is
actually only a small fraction of the estimated no-effect level in man." Nat'l Acad. of
Sciences-Nat'l Research Council, "No Residue" and "Zero Tolerance,' 20 FOOD, DRUG
& CosmtE. L.J. 608, 617 n.6 (1965).
80. See MRAic REPORT 374. The scientific community has not recommended that
breast feeding be abandoned in favor of other methods of infant nutrition. Id.
81. MRAK REPORT 233.
82. See MRAK REPoRT 235-36.
83. See the unpublished papers of Ortega, Pathology of DDT and Dieldrin in Rats;
Revzin, Effects of Endrin it Birds & Monkeys; Van Gelder, The Electro Physiological
and Behavioral Effects of Insecticides in Sheep; Woolley, Effects of DDT on the Nervous
System of the Rat. (These papers were presentd at a three day symposium entitled "The
Biological Impact of Pesticides in the Environment," held on August 18-20, 1969 at
Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon).
84. See MRAx REPORT 325.
85. Innes et al., Bioassay of Pesticides and Industrial Chemicals for Turn origenicity
it Mice: A .Preliminary Note, 42 3. NAT. CANCER INST. 1101 (1969).
86. See text accompanying notes 143-64, infra, for a discussion of the Delaney amend-
ment.
87. Mka.x REPORT 471.
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Lawyers often talk about permissible and impermissible risks. Invariably, an
assessment of the social utility of any conduct involves a judgment about the
benefits realized as well as the costs exacted. Learned Hand has made the point
in terms of the negligence formhla familiar to every first year law student; "if
the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden B; liability depends
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e., whether B is less than
PL."88 Regardless of the term used to describe undesirable conduct, it is in-
disputable that society-has an interest in discouraging or forbidding activity
that creates hazards to the population and the environment to a: degree dis-
proportionate to the benefits anticipated.
Viewed in these terms and at this level of abstraction, all pollution cases
look alike. The polluter always gives us some good with the bad: the home-
owner, commercial sprayer or farmer controls harmful insect pests by applying
a chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticide; the mill manufactures paper or the
smelter produces copper. These productive activities have unwelcome and in-
jurious side effects: pulp wastes are toxic to marine life, emissions from the
smelter destroy plants, and the applications of chemical pesticides are injurious
to numerous non-target species. The issue in each case, in familiar legal and
economic terms, is whether the costs of discontinuing the productive activity
or, alternatively, of controlling the coincidental pollution, can be justified when
measured against the benefits realized.
An evalution of the issue, so described, is difficult. The Mrak Commission
has given us strong evidence that many of the variables are still largely un-
known. Moreover, because of our general inability to reduce intangibles to
dollar terms, definitive economic answers to pollution issues are unlikely in
any event. In fact, none of the significant parameters of resource allocation
in pesticide use is known.8 9 For example, we do not even know the extent
to which chemicals are used in agriculture, much less the quantity used in the
production of a specific crop or livestock commodity.90 We are unable to
judge, in dollar terms, the increase in productivity attributable to the con-
tinued use of DDT. We are incapable, in addition, of assessing in economic
terms the risks to our marine and recreational resources and the toll upon wild-
life exacted by this pest control technique. Nor can we place values upon the
costs of substituting other inputs such as land, labor, fertilizer, and most im-
portantly, alternative less persistent pesticides. 91 And no strictly economic
88. United States v. Carroll Towing Co,, 159 F2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) ; see B. Com-
MONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL 98-99 (1966).
89. See J. HEADLEY & J. LEWIS, THE PESTIcmEs PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO PUBLIC POLICY 27 (1967).
90. See MRAl: REPORT 57.
91. See Clement, The Pesticide Problem, 8 NAT. RES. J. 11, 13-14 (1968). The British
have estimated that barring the use of aldrin, chlordane, dieldrin, DDT, endrin and
Heptachlor would increase agricultural production costs by about 3.5% and "perhaps only
for that period of time necessary to perfect alternative control measures." Id. at 13 & n.9,
citing MINISTRY, OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (LONDON), REPORT OF THE
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analysis can take into account value judgements and political priorities which
often predominate in discussions of pollution control. In short, the nation may
prefer to preserve the bald eagle though the decision entails a sacrifice in
productivity far in excess of the dollar value of a few carrion-eating birds.
This is not to concede, however, that the merits of the controversy over
further widespread usage of DDT deserve further debate. However imperfect
our knowledge, the case against the persistent pesticides is as thoroughly proved
as any other instance of modern pollution. Secretary Finch appears to be con-
vinced: "We should all clearly recognize that to wait until the proof concerning
all hazards of pesticide usage is academically indisputable may be more danger-
ous to us and our environment than we can afford . . . . We must act now
or face the consequences of having acted too late."912 This note of urgency, long
overdue, is being repeated throughout the world and across the country as state
after state hastens to restrict severely the use of the persistent pesticides.93 In
large measure, it appears that the legal and political decision to eliminate the
chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides has been made. Ideally, this decision should
be implemented by immediately confining usage to emergency situations requir-
ing vector control by public health authorities.9 4
The legal issues exposed by the DDT controversy and to be explored in
this article are not whether to ban DDT and related chemicals but rather why
steps to effectuate restrictions have been so long delayed; whether the actions
undertaken go far enough and fast enough and are likely in any event to prove
effective; and what role the law has played in eliminating this environmental
contaminant. Most important, a legal analysis requires inquiry into possible
reforms, apart from revision of the registration process already mentioned, that
will protect against a repetition of this sorry experience with pesticides pol-
lution.
D. Essential Uses: The Essential Question
The Mrak Commission's recommendations to restrict persistent pesticides
to those uses "essential to the preservation of human health and welfare,"03
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON POISONOUS SUBSTANCES USED IN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
STORAGE, REVIEw OF THE PERSISTENT ORGANOCHLORINE PESTICIDES 6 (1964).
92. Statement of Secretary Finch, Dec. 23, 1969, p. 1; see Statement of President
Richard M. Nixon, in N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1970, at 12, col. 5 ("It is literally now or
never") (upon the occasion of signing the National Environmental Policy Act).
93. ARiz. BD. OF PEST CONTROL, RULE 20 (as amended June 13, 1969) ; 3 CALIF.
ADMN. CODE §§ 2408, 2409, 2463.4 (regulations); FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 7E-2.22
(regulations effective Dec. 17, 1969); ILL. PEST. CONTROL LAW, REG. 1.1 (effective
June 25, 1969) ; MICH. DEP'T OF AGRIc., NEWS RELEASES, April 18, 1969, and June 25,
1969; Statement by the SWEDISH NAT'L POISONS AND PESTICIDES BD., March 27, 1969;
WASH. DEP'T OF AGRIc., EMERGENCY ORDER No. 1136, effective Dec. 29, 1969; Wis.
ASSEMBLY BILL 163, 1969 Sess.; see N.Y. Times, Nov. 4. 1969, at 10 col. 3.
1 94. Michigan authorizes "limited registration of DDT formulations for use by govern-
ment agencies in the performance of their duties involving public health and by professional
structural pest control operators for indoor control of house mice, bats, ecto-parasites
of mice, bats, and rats and lice of humans"' IcH. DEP'T OF AGIuC., NEWS RELEASES,
supra note 93.
95. MRAx REPORT 8.
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without more, are empty posturizing. Skepticism is warranted in light of
similar unfulfilled recommendations of other distinguished panels convened in
recent years. 0
In 1963 the President's Science Advisory Committee declared that "elim-
ination of the use of persistent toxic pesticides should be the goal." 97 In 1965
the same group recommended that "unnecessary use of pesticides should be
avoided wherever possible."98 A sub-panel report noted emphatically that,
"[s]ubstantial reduction in insecticide use, in specific cases as much as 50%,
can be made by applying our present knowledge of pests and their control." 99
In 1966 the Committee on Government Operations (the Ribicoff Committee)
of the United States Senate recommended that industry and government "ac-
celerate the development of non-chemical pest-control methods."'0 0 In May of
1969 a report of the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences urged "that further and more effective steps be taken to reduce the
needless or inadvertent release of persistent pesticides into the environment."''
In September of 1969 the American Chemical Society went so far as to recom-
mend that "where possible, highly persistent materials should be replaced by
rapidly degradable materials."'1 2 The Mrak Commission's recommendation
to eliminate "non-essential" useg thus offers no new insights.
Some action is at last under way although the consequences remain
obscure. On November 24, the Pesticides Regulation Division of USDA an-
nounced a cancellation of registrations, to become effective in thirty days, for
all products containing DDT and bearing directions for use by persons other
than public officials in aquatic areas and for use on shade trees, tobacco and
in and around the home.10 3 Included was a pronouncement that, "The De-
partment is considering cancellation of any other uses of DDT unless it can
be shown that certain uses are essential in the protection of human health and
welfare and only those uses for which there are no effective and safe substitutes
for the intended use will be continued.' 0 4 Ninety days were allotted during
which comments would be received. A final disposition is promised by Decem-
ber 31, 1970. In short, the Pesticides Regulation Division, inspired by the
recommendations of the Mrak Commission, has taken steps to cancel DDT
registrations for several recommended uses and has initiated rule making pro-
ceedings to determine whether other uses are "essential" to the public wel-
96. See text accompanying notes 97-102 infra.
97. USE OF PESTICIDES 28.
98. U.S. PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMM., ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PANEL,
RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 17 (1965).
99. Id. at 291.
100. RmBicoFF REPORT, supra note 19, at 68.
101. JENSEN COMMITTEE REPORT 29.
102. Summary and Recontiendations, Report of the American Chemical Society,
Cleaning Our Environment-The Chemical Basis for Action, in CHEMICAL & ENGI-
NEERING Naws, Sept. 8, 1969, at 9.




fare. 105 Six chemical companies, exercising their rights under FIFRA, already
have challenged the proposed cancellations by requesting that the matter be
referred to a scientific advisory committee for a recommendation. 10
Reaction to the release of the Commission's findings and the subsequent
initiatives by USDA has been swift and laudatory. The Environmental Quality
Council of the President's Office applauded the actions taken by Secretary
of Agriculture Hardin with regard to DDT registrations, pointing out that the
proposed cancellations would affect perhaps 357o of the DDT used in the
country.'07 The New York Times praised Secretary Finch for taking a "giant
step forward in reducing the menace to all living creatures of the long-lasting
poisons that have been used with such careless and ignorant abandon for so
many years."'-08 The Washington Post observed, "We think the whole country
will be relieved that a broad program to eliminate this new man-made menace
in our environment has been launched."'109 Editorial comment across the
nation reiterated these sentiments."10
Lest complacency attend this "giant step forward" in the interests of con-
sumer and environmental protection, however, some precautions are in order.
Plainly, the proposed cancellations, if and when they become effective, are not
self-enforcing. Rewriting a few labels will accomplish no reform. The assump-
tion that pesticides will be used according to directions is demonstrably fal-
lacious."' So long as DDT is sold in bulk, as it presently is, it may be used
by the grower on tobacco or any other crop with few meaningful controls." 2
The proposed cancellation with respect to home uses ultimately may prove
effective but only if the manufacturers abandon home use packaging, a decision
that is not inevitable.1xa The proposed cancellation restricting uses in aquatic
environments except where essential for control of disease vectors "as deter-
mined by public health officials" is largely descriptive of present practice, since
nobody uses DDT in aquatic environments except public health officials whose
heroics in the interests of mosquito control often have demonstrated little re-
gard for the environment." 14
In addition, for any cancellation to prove effective some committment by
105. Recently similar steps were taken to cancel the registrations of aldrin and
dieldrin for "acquatic" uses. See Wall St. J., March 10, 1970, at 5, col. 2.
106. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1970 at -, col. -.
107. See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, No. 20, 1969.
108. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1969, at 46, col. 2.
109. Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1969, at A18, col. 2.
110. E.g., Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 19, 1969 at 6, col. 1.
111. See text accompanying notes 217, 235 infra.
112. See id. for a discussion of the few effective controls on pesticide usage.
113. It is arguable, for example, that DDT may still be used on home gardens and
therefore that form of packaging will be justifiable.
114. See, e.g., Croker & Wilson, Kinetics and Effects of DDT in a Tidal Marsh Ditch,
24 TRANs. A m. FISH Soc. 152 (1965) ; Laycock, The Beginning of the End for DDT,
AUDUBON MAGAZINE, July, 1969, at 37, 40-41; Woodwell et al., DDT Residues in an East




PRD, beyond what has been demonstrated -in the past, is essential. As men-
tioned, to date, no registration ever has been cancelled over the formal opposi-
tion of the chemical pesticides industry." 5 Also, it is perhaps naive to assume
that, after cancellation, notices will be sent to the distributors of the affected
products."" And to expect PRD to take the obvious step of seizing supplies
bound for the homeowner is to expect action inconsistent with the traditions
of the agency. Twenty years elapsed before PRD initiated its first action to
recall products found to be unsafe.1 17 Despite the cancellation, on August 1,
1965, of 58 thallium products, which had resulted in numerous accidental
poisoning cases among children, pesticides containing thallium still were avail-
able in retail outlets two years later, because the responsible officials neglected
to obtain information on the quantities and location of products that had en-
tered marketing channels prior to the cancellation date.118 Other reasons for
harboring continuing doubts about the decisiveness of the government's most
recent legal steps against the persistent pesticides require a further look at
PRD and the chemical pesticides industry.
E. The Agency and the Industry: Commitment to the Status Quo
It deserves emphasis that the USDA, which has scarcely distinguished it-
self as a vigorous proponent of the public interest, is the agency presently re-
sponsible for deciding what DDT uses are essential. For years the agency,
systematically and flagrantly, has failed to enforce the basic pesticides legis-
lation protecting the American consumer." 9 Through unfaithful administration
the legislation as written has been reduced to a mockery.'2 0
The experience with DDT is illustrative. Under FIFRA an insecticide is
misbranded if when used in accordance with commonly recognized practice it
causes injury to non-target species.' 2 ' For more than 20 years DDT has
been so implicated,122 with the accumulating scientific evidence about its
effects on non-target species becoming more persuasive and disturbing
with each passing year. Nothing was done. As late as July 14, 1969, a de-
partmental spokesman was quoted as saying that he was aware of no evidence
indicating that DDT was unsafe.1231ncredibly, under existing regulations DDT
115. See DEFICIENCIES REPORT 8.
116. Id.
117. Pesticides Pollution: Part II, in 1969 CONSUMER REPORTS, 478, 480 (quoting the
Washington Post).
118. COiPOuILER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS oN NEED TO IMPROVE
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES INVOLVING PESTICIDES 11-13 (1968).
119. DEFIcIENcIEs REPORT and Deficiencies Hearings, passim.
120. Id.
121. 7 U.S.C. § 135 (z) (2) (g) (1964).
122. E.g., Benton, Effects on Wildlife of DDT Used for Control of Dutch Elm
Disease, 15 J. WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 20 (1951) ; Couch, Effects of DDT on Wildlife
in a Mississippi River Bottom Woodland, in TRANscRIPr, 11th NAT'L AMER. WILDLIFE
CONF. 323 (1946).
123. See 115 CONG. REc. 5889 (daily ed. July 14, 1969) (quoting Dr. George W.
Irving, administrator of the Agricultural Research Service.)
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is recommended for use on over 200 field crops.12 4 It remains to be seen
how many of these uses are deemed "essential." Finally, after years of delay
PRD has initiated some action of limited scope, but this much has occurred only
upon the recommendation of a Commission appointed by the Secretary of an-
other department and following disclosures that amount to a national scandal.
It is hardly surprising that significant segments of our population have legiti-
mate doubts about the willingness or ability of some public officials to meet
their responsibilities.
In theory, a cancellation of registration may proceed upon notification
of the registrant and an explanation of the reasons for the proposed action.
The registrant may acquiesce, request a public hearing or request that the
matter be referred to an advisory committee of the National Academy of
Sciences. 2 5 In practice, cancellation proceedings may be suspended indefinitely
if a registrant calls the bluff of PRD by requesting a hearing or referral to an
advisory committee.' 20 Since the industry has requested such a referral with
respect to the proposed DDT cancellations, it remains to be seen whether
PRD's tradition of inaction will be maintained. Furthermore, though there
is nothing in the legislation to indicate that the burden of proof with respect
to the safety of a product should shift once the manufacturer secures an initial
registration, PRD has assumed that it has the obligation to prove the product
was unsafe before a registration could be cancelled. 27 Clearing the hurdle of an
initial registration thus has the practical effect of immunizing a pesticide from
future scrutiny.
The influence of PRD's administrative myopia deserves emphasis. State
registrations for chemical pesticides often incorporate explicitly existing
federal registrations. 12s Some state officials believe they are without the power
to forbid uses authorized by PRD.120 Recommendations in the state spray
handbooks, which are the bibles for the user,13 0 follow religiously the current
wisdom as articulated by PRD. The competitive disadvantage threatening local
124. See USDA, SUmiARY op REGISTERED ARGICULTURAL PESTICIDE CHEMICAL
USES 212-225a (June 20, 1967).
125. 7 U.S.C. § 135b (1964).
126. See DEFIcIENcIES REPORT 47-50.
127. Id. at 51-52. On the significance of burden of proof rules in environmental liti-
gation, see Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof: Some Comments
and Suggestions. (unpublished paper presented at Conference on Law and the Environ-
ment on file at The Conservation Foundation, Wash., D.C. Sept., 1969.)
128. E.g., REv. CODE WASH. § 15.57.020(27) (1961).
129. See. Statement of the Honorable Donald M. Moos, Wash. Director of Agri-
culture, Dec. 29, 1969, p. 4 (on File with author) ("The federal government controls the
registration and labeling of pesticides in interstate commerce. The State of Washington
has conformed and will continue to conform to any restrictions on registration or labeling
adopted by the federal government.")
130. The agricultural extension service in each state prepares detailed hand books for
the user recommending types and amounts of pesticides for the control of insects and
frequency and content of the application. In practice, these books prepared by ento-
mologists are the how-to-do-it kits for the applicator and, consequently, are highly in-
fluential in determining pesticide usage throughout the country.
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growers, who are denied access to DDT still available in neighboring states,
is another principle stumbling block to unilateral bans in the absence of
action at the federal level. In the State of Washington, for example, despite
lengthy hearings, the Director of Agriculture has refused to cancel registrations
affecting agricultural uses without a pronouncement from a higher authority
on what uses are essential.' 31
Resolution of the DDT issue, then, depends in large measure upon the
outcome of the rule-making proceeding which is presently pending before
PRD. Legal, institutional and economic pressures combine to endow this
agency with pivotal influence over the persistent pesticides. Its past perfor-
mance suggests that governmental and private watchdogs should remain alert.
That the chemical pesticides industry also deserves a lion's share of the
responsibility for postponing judgment day on the persistent pesticides is not
to be doubted. Industry opposition has been determined, inflexible, sometimes
frantic and always discouraging to those seeking a cooperative approach to
combatting pesticides pollution. Despite FIFRA, the industry, through domi-
nation of PRD, retains effective control over the registration, sale and use of
chemical pesticides in this country. The consequences of this self-regulation
have been indelibly and tragically recorded throughout the environment and
our population.
At the outset, it is understandable why the industry would take an
advocate's view of the DDT issue. The chemical was a Nobel prize winner,
and has had a proud history. It still performs yeoman service in controlling
malaria throughout the world. DDT is persistent and cheap for the applicator
and farmer. Its elimination for some uses could result in severe short-run
economic dislocation. Yet DDT's persistence, proclaimed as a positive virtue
in pest control operations, is the same quality that jeopardizes many non-target
organisms. And the economic argument overlooks the immense cost to the
environment as well as the long-range spiraling costs of maintaining sophis-
ticated chemical control programs.
What is more difficult to understand is the vehemency and tenacity with
which many industry representatives have clung to an untenable position.
Throughout the controversy, the attack on DDT has been viewed largely as
an assault on the entire chemical pesticides industry :132 opponents of DDT
were pure food nuts, bug lovers, Rachel Carsonites or worse. 133 Less than a
131. Wash. Dep't of Agric., Emergency Order No. 1136, effective Dec. 29, 1969.
132. See 27 NEws & PEsTIcmz REVIEW 2 (1969).
133. See, e.g., McLean, Pesticides and the Environment, 17 B1o-ScIENcE 613, 615-16
(1967) (the author, an attorney, represented the industry task force in the Wisconsin
DDT hearings); Testimony of Thomas J. Jukes, Professor of Medical Physics, Uni-
versity of California, Washington DDT Hearings; Testimony of Dr. Hardin B. Jones,
Assistant Director, Donner Laboratory, University of California, id.; Testimony of
Dr. Donald A. Spencer, National Agricultural Chemicals Ass'n, id.; Testimony of
Mr. Max Sobelman, Plant Superintendent, Montrose Chemical Corp. of California, id.;
Seattle Times, October 16, 1969, at 9, col. 1. A spokesman for Shell Chemical Co. has
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month before Secretary Finch's release of the Mrak Commission recommenda-
tions, industry spokesmen were making preposterous assertions that the
elimination of DDT, which was said to symbolize all pesticides, would reduce
by one-half food production in the United States ;134 or that the movement to
ban DDT was essentially an attack on the entire capitalistic profit system. 185
No reputable scientist would deny that the persistent pesticides have been a
factor of significance in reducing the peregrine falcon to the verge of extinc-
tion.130 Industry representatives did.137 Unwarranted, exaggerated predictions
of famine and plague were part of the accepted rhetoric of the industry's
resistance.
Undoubtedly, the chemical pesticides industry is not the first to stretch
a point in support of a special interest. Sloppy science, misleading rhetoric
and outright emotionalism no doubt have characterized some of the assaults
against DDT. Exposing industry tactics is nevertheless valuable to emphasize
that more is involved to law reform in pollution cases than having the truth
on your side. Ideally, scientists should be able to agree on indisputable scien-
tific propositions. Presentation of the data to the decision-maker then would
result in an appropriate political decision, reconciling conflicting interests. But
this model overlooks obfuscation, half-truths and outright unscientific balder-
dash presented by industry spokesmen to unsophisticated or impressionable
legislators or administrators. The repeated observation among law-makers that
"scientists never agree"'138 is not so much an accurate description of the state
of our knowledge but rather an observation about what often happens to the
integrity of that data in a political forum.
One legal technique for minimizing distortions which impede the pursuit
of truth in the regulation of chemical pesticides is the time-honored tradition
of cross-examination. In Wisconsin, industry and agency personnel were
embarrassed repeatedly by competent cross-examination, a risk that attends
stubborn affirmation of an untenable position. 3 9 In Washington, where the
proceedings were treated as administrative rule-making, the industry per-
formed with greater confidence and recklessness because no rights of cross-
examination were preserved. Beyond this, every legal initiative that promotes
a hearing for the unrepresented consumer contributes to assuring the integrity
of the scientific premises of administrative action.140 The role of the law as
stated that if aldrin is banned his company would continue to sell the product. Cavender,
The Big Pesticide Battle, Top OPERATOR, March, 1970, at 31.
134. Testimony of Thomas H. Jukes, supra note 133.
135. Testimony of Max Sobelman, supra note 133.
136. See J. HICKEY, PEREGRINE FALCON POPULATIONS: THEm BIOLOGY AND DECLINE
(1969).
137. Testimony of Thomas H. Jukes, supra note 133.
138. See Ribicoff Hearings pt. 3, at 664.
139. See Rogin, All He Wants to Save is the World, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 3,
1969, at 24; Wurster, The Wisconsin DDT Hearings, 19 BIo-SCIENCE 809 (1969).




an instrument, for realigning institutions to deal more thoroughly and respon-
sibly with their regulatory problems will be next discussed. One reform already
mentioned would require the concurrence of HEW and USDI in the registra-
tion of chemical pesticides. Other improvements are reflected in the following
recommendations of the Mrak Commission.
II. REORGANIZATION OF HEW
Recommendation II. Improve cooperation among the various
elements of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare which
are concerned with the effects of pest control and pesticides.
Recommendation IX. Establish a Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare Clearinghouse for pesticide information and develop
pesticide protection teams.
Recommendation VI. Create a pesticide advisory committee in
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to evaluate in-formation on the hazards of pesticides to human health and environ-
mental quality and to advise the Secretary on related matters.
All of these recommendations are commendable and responsive to the
glaring inadequacies of present regulation. Departmental inefficiencies, con-
demned in Recommendation II, are ever present and always to be deplored.
The proposal to establish a clearinghouse on technical information in Recom-
mendation IX recognizes that the time lag between scientific discoveries and
decisive political action implementing this knowledge must be reduced. The
inability of the agencies to assimilate scientific data and to act accordingly
has been demonstrated time and again in the regulation of chemical pesticides.
Six-teen years elapsed between the publication of research indicating that the
use of lindane around food would result in contamination and administrative
action by PRD eliminating the danger.1 41 As early as 1947 a study spon-
sored by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) disclosed that rats
which were fed DDT suffered an increased incidence of liver tumors.142 With
the passage of the Delaney amendment to the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act in
1958,143 Congress unequivocally embraced a policy instructing the FDA to
exclude from the food supply all substances found to be carcinogenic in animal
tests. One would suppose that, on this ground alone, continued use of DDT
should have been questioned years ago by the agency. Unfortunately, bringing
the administrator and the scientist together proved to be administratively
impossible.
The proposal to establish a Pesticide Advisory Committee implicitly
acknowledges that HEW, as presently constituted, is poorly organized to
141. See DEFIcIENcIES REPORT 32.142. Fitzhugh & Nelson, 89 J. PHAmACOL. Exp. THERAP. 18 (1947). One 17 year
old study vas highly influential in the decision to eliminate cyclamates. See Press Con-
ference of Secretary Robert H. Finch, Oct. 18, 1969, pp. 15, 19, 31-32 (Transcript).
143. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (3) (A) (1964).
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protect the public welfare against pesticide risks. The Commission should
be commended for recognizing that "advisory services of a group drawn from
the professional, industrial and academic specialists in related fields can
provide unique and essential services. '1 44 Perhaps non-governmental scientists
are less confined by political pressures or the unproductive syndrome of
bureaucratic self-justification. There is some evidence that the agencies are
unable to attract and hold capable scientists against the competitive lure of
private industry and the academic community.' 45 Outstanding research scien-
tists are inclined to shun the bureaucracy's "timetables and deadlines, and the
digressions from any systematic development of [their] own research,' 40
with a consequent impairment in the responsiveness of policy to laboratory
findings. In the words of ex-FDA Commissioner Herbert Ley, "A majority
of the medical staff people are retreads, persons who have suffered coronaries
or who have personality problems.' 47
The Commission's insistence that FDA reorganize itself better to absorb
the scientific facts is a commendable objective. One point is indisputable.
Years of governmental mismanagement and industry irresponsibility have
produced a crisis in pesticides pollution. Changes in policy, now imminent,
will have occurred only upon the recommendation of a largely non-govern-
mental group of scientists who have contributed to the Mrak Commission
report. The suggestion to institutionalize this Commission as a continuously
functioning Pesticide Advisory Committee deserves widespread support. Such
a "third force," if effectively implemented, could contribute materially to
assuring that governmental policy is more responsive to scientific verities.148
One word of caution is in order, however. An Advisory Committee is only
as strong as its personnel and as influential as the agency wishes it to be.
Reorganizing HEW is no guarantee against further mismanagement if repre-
sentatives of special interests dominate the group. The performance of PRD's
Task Force on Pesticides Regulation illustrates what can happen when "bold
new initiatives" originate from those who are satisfied with the status quo.140
A genuine commitment is necessary to transform an advisory committee into
a viable institution. Government today is becoming increasingly dependent
144. MRAK REPORT 11.
145. The low educational level among state officials responsible for enforcing pesticides
legislation strongly suggests that significant policy initiatives at this level are unlikely,
especially those based on scientific research that, to the uninitiated, sounds like a fairy
tale. See HOUSE CorM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS, CONSUMsER PROTECTION ACTIVITIES OF
STATE Gov'Ts, H.R. REP.. No. 921, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 140 (1963). The FDA also lacks
qualified personnel essential to informed decisions. See Ribicoff Hearings pt. 3, at
735-36, 784.
146. Willcox, Public Protection, Private Choices and Scientific Freedom: Food,
Drugs and Environmental Hazards, 18 FooD, DRUG & COSmET. L. RP-R. 321, 334 (1963).
147. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
148. See note 225 infra.
149. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE PESTICIDES REGULATION DIvIsioN
(1965), in Deficiencies Hearings 248-95 (App. 6).
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upon special commissions for policy initiatives. Yet little academic thought has
been given to the process of selecting these committees and their staffs and
their ability to offer unbiased, thorough policy directives. To assure continuing
responsiveness within HEW, the Mrak Commission's successor, the proposed
Pesticides Advisory Committee, must include spokesmen for all points of view.
All too often the politics of pesticides has interfered with the transmission of
scientific truths to the political decision-maker.
III. IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS REGULATING THE RELEASE OF
CHEMICAL PESTICIDES INTO THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE FOOD SUPPLY
Recommendation VI1. Develop suitable standards for pesticide
content in food, water and air and other aspects of environmental
quality, that (1) protect the public from undue hazards, and (2)
recognize the need for optional human nutrition and food supply.
The recommendation that HE, develop suitable standards for pesticide
content in food is hardly revolutionary since the Secretary has had this
responsibility under existing law since an amendment to the Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act in 1938.15" The Commission is specific, though somewhat-ellip-
tical, in rebuking the FDA: "Tolerances for DDT residues in fish should
be subjected to immediate review and reflect the relative importance of the
food in the diet."''1 1 Before celebrating this new initiative in consumer pro-
tection, however, it should be remembered that in 1963 the President's Science
Advisory Committee recommended that "the Food and Drug Administration
proceed as rapidly as possible with its current review of residue tolerances,
and the experimental studies on which they are based."'152 Proceeding "as
rapidly as possible" surely presupposes action beyond the appointment of
another commission six years later to reiterate earlier recommendations. In
truth, lax administration by the FDA combined with the wholesale default
of the PRD has resulted in the present crisis in the enforcement of the
pesticides laws.
The past performance of the FDA gives little cause for optimism. The
DDT tolerances, which remained unchanged for eighteen years, were estab-
lished on the basis of extensive public hearings held in 1950, a date well back
in the dark ages of our pesticides experience.' 5 3 Four years later the FDA still
had not issued general tolerances, a situation resulting in great uncertainty
within the food industry.154 The solution, supported by the industry and the
agency and enacted into law in the form of the Miller Amendment, was to
vest the power to initiate tolerance proceedings in interested manufacturers.
150. 52 Stat. 1049 (1938).
151. MRAic REPORT 13.
152. USE OF PESTICIDES, supra note 65, at 20.
153. See CCH FOOD, DRUG & CosmET. LAw RFpR. f 54,447.
154. See SEN. REP. No. 1635, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954).
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An applicant must submit information, which remains confidential,1I0 concern-
ing the chemical identity of the compound, its toxicity to laboratory animals,
and the amount, frequency and time of application on the crops covered. He
is required to submit data disclosing the residue that would remain following
the recommended application of the pesticide and information supporting the
tolerance requested. 5 6 The FDA, either on its own or after receiving a
report from an advisory committee, either must establish a tolerance, which
may be zero, or exempt a chemical from the tolerance requirements. Thus,
unlike the former practice, tolerances now may be established without a public
hearing.' 57
The FDA supports the present procedure, largely on the ground that
administration otherwise would be impossible.158 It is nevertheless clear that
the power to establish tolerances is largely a matter of the manufacturer's
initiative, with the government's role being reduced to reviewing the submitted
data. The consequences have been detrimental. First, the ex parte nature of
the proceeding and the one-sided form of the submission have resulted in
setting tolerance levels that are unacceptable from the consumer's point of
view. Second, the staff of the FDA, perhaps because the initiative is not theirs
alone, has been unable to muster the resources to develop a comprehensive,
enlightened set of tolerances. In the words of one participant, "because of
unclear procedural guidelines, divergent points of view and the everchanging
methodology of the pesticide industry, a significant amount of work has
never produced a truly complete set of standards."'' 5 Steps were taken in
1968 to reduce DDT tolerance levels on a number of food products on a
gradual basis to become effective finally on January 1, 1970.100 The Mrak
Commission now discloses that many of these recently revised tolerances are
out of date in light of the disturbing new evidence implicating DDT as a
health hazard.
Reform perhaps need not go so far as to revert to the former practice
where tolerances are set by the FDA only on the basis of information adduced
at a public hearing. Short of this, however, all data used as a basis for
granting registration and establishing tolerances should be published, thus
allowing the hypothesis and the "validity and reliability" of the information
to be subjected to "critical review" by the public and the scientific com-
155. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(f) (1964).
156. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(d) (1964).
157. See SEN. REP. No. 1635, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess, 4-5 (1954). Compare Oser, Where
is Industry s Voice in Food Regulations?, 23 FooD, DRUG & COS. 1ET. L. Rm. 317 (1968)
(discussing procedures for establishing tolerances).
158. See SEN. REP. No. 1635, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
159. Rohrman, Pesticide Laws and Legal Implications of Pesticide Use-Part I, 23
FOOD DRUG Cosm. LJ. 142, 151 (1968).
160. 33 Fed. Reg. 2787 (1968); see 20 Fed. Reg. 1473 (1955) (order establishing
tolerances on the basis of the 1950 hearings).
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munity.161 Thus, the FDA would be afforded some insights from a segment
of the community that is not commercially interested.
Also important are regulatory priorities. The commission recommends
that the proposed Pesticide Advisory Committee consider a "graded series
of regulatory actions developed in proportion to the extent of environmental
contamination of risk thereof, in relation to total human exposure, actual daily
intake, and total body burden of pesticide residues."'u 2 Grade IV would
include those pesticides creating "widespread or severe environmental con-
tamination or general risk" to human health.10 3 A pesticide so designated
would be banned for "all non-essential uses" and removed from the general
market. Future use would be approved by permit only.
What the Commission is saying is that some pesticides ate so manifestly
inappropriate for general Use that they do not merit routine consideration
under the tolerance procedures. Presumably, DDT and the related chlorinated
hydrocarbon pesticides fall into this unhappy category. A system of classifica-
tion would assist the agency to allocate resources, to scrutinize uses, and to
monitor the effects of those compounds whose biological and chemical prop-
erties are predictably dangerous. Requiring use by permit would avoid the
indiscriminate application that is the inevitable result of a regulatory scheme
that depends upon the fictitious controls of a label or spray handbook. Legis-
lative action at the state level requiring use by permit also would be desirable.
The Commission wisely reinforces its precautionary approach by recommend-
ing an expansion of the use of experimental labels which allow a manufacturer
to place a relatively small amount of a product on the market.164
In sum, the Mrak Commission's recommendations to rethink the tolerance
levels suggest that some measure of effective regulation may be restored
after-the-fact by the FDA, although the crucial decisions affecting registration
remain largely responsive to the whims of PRD. It should be remembered,
however, that tightening tolerance levels and seizing more contaminated food
161. UsE OF PEsTICIDEs 17.
162. MRAK REPORT 13.
163. Id.
164. See id. 75-76. Manifestly, sharply confining the use of a new componud
having unknown effects is to be preferred to authorizing its release, willy nilly,
among the population at large. On the other hand, one would hope that exhaustive testing
would occur before a pesticide is registered even on an experimental basis. In this respect,
the Commission's justification for expanding the concept of experimental permits is not
entirely satisfactory:
the limited sale in regular commercial channels without [sic] the requirement
of [accounting for] biological results on the material should be permitted or
even made mandatory for 1 year prior to a full registration. This would go even
further toward enabling the manufacturer to assess the product in the market
place but with a limited exposure on his part and would similarly provide the





plainly are not substitutes for effective predictive judgments at the registra-
tion level.
Recommendation V. Minimize human exposure to those pesti-
cides considered to present a potential health hazard to man.
This recommendation, like No. VII, could hardly be praised for breaking
new ground. Congress specifically has instructed the Secretary of HEW, in
establishing tolerance levels, to give consideration to the "ways in which the
consumer may be affected by the .. pesticide chemical or by other related
substances that are poisonous or deleterious."' 0 5 The Commission introduces
a note of urgency by conceding that, in recent "impressive" animal studies,
several compounds, including DDT, have been identified as carcinogenic;
others have been adjudged teratogenic. 106 Causing cancer or birth defects in
test animals appears to be sufficient grounds for further recommendations "to
reexamine the registered uses of the materials ... to institute prudent steps
in order to minimize human exposure" and "to undertake additional appro-
priate evalutory research."'16 7 The subcommittee on mutagenicity reiterated
these sentiments by emphasizing that the widespread use of pesticides may be
damaging to our heredity:
If this is so, we may be unwittingly harming our descendants.
Whether this is happening, and if so, what is the magnitude of the
effect, is regrettably unknown. Surely one of the greatest respon-
sibilities of our generation is our temporary custody of the genetic
heritage received from our ancestors. We must make every reasonable
effort to insure that this heritage is passed on to future generations
undamaged. To do less, we believe, is grossly irresponsible.108
Suggesting that HEW take a hard look at pesticides that may cause cancer
or genetic mutations will generate little controversy. The same cannot be said
for the Commission's treatment of the Delaney amendment.
Recommendation VIII. Seek modification of the Delaney clause
to permit the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare to determine when evidence of carcinogenesis justifies re-
strictive action concerning food containing analytically detectable
traces of chemicals.
A. The Legislation: Cutting Down on Cancer
The Delaney amendment was born amidst the cranberry scare of the late
nineteen fifties.1 69 The anti-cancer clause was not included in the original food
165. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1964).
166. MRAK REPORT 471.
167. Id. at 10-11.
168. Id. at 568.
169. See, e.g., Note, Agricultural Pesticides: The Need for Improved Control Legisla-
tion, 5Z Mnix. L. REv. 1242, 1251-52 (1968); Hearings on Dcp't of Agriculture Ap-
propriations for 1966 Before the Subcomm. on Dep't of Agriculture and Related Agescies
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additive bill170 reported unanimously by the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on July 28, 1958. The provision was inserted as a com-
mittee amendment after the bill had been reported to the House, and it
appeared in the legislation which was enacted into law on September 6, 1958.171
No hearings were held on the amendment. The legislative history discloses
that the clause was thought to be superfluous since the bill was intended to
exclude from the food supply "any substances the ingestion of which reason-
able people would expect to produce not just cancer but any disease or
disability. '1 72
The Delaney amendment states unequivocally, with exceptions not here
material, that no food additive "shall be deemed to be safe if it is found
to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after
tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives,
to induce cancer in man or animal."173 In 1960, Congress incorporated a
similar clause into the color additive amendments to the Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act.174 Any food containing an unsafe food additive or color additive
is adulterated within the meaning of the act and is subject to seizure.175
The anti-cancer amendment quickly became embroiled in a national con-
troversy over chemical additives. In January, 1958, USDA registered the
herbicide amintriazole as a weedkiller for use on cranberry bogs on a "no
residue" basis because the proposed pattern of use indicated that no residues
would result on that year's crop. In February, 1959, a petition requesting a
tolerance of 1 part per million for amintriazole for use on cranberries, apples
and pears was filed with the FDA. In May, 1959, on the basis of the recently
enacted Delaney amendment, the FDA concluded that a tolerance was in-
appropriate because pathological studies disclosed that the herbicide produced
cancer in test animals. Later that year, upon discovering that amintriazole
had been used on cranberry bogs, the FDA moved to seize 300,000 pounds of
cranberries. A press release, issued by HEW Secretary Fleming on Novem-
ber 9, pointed out that the chemical involved was carcinogenic and, more
dramatically, that it would take until Christmas to bury the contaminated
cranberries "with the use of bulldozers." At the time USDA, consistently
with its tradition, opposed the publicity, fearing that it would result in un-
necessary public alarm.176 Predictably, not many people ate cranberries for
Appropriations of the Howe Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
175-79 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Whitten Committee Hearings].
170. H.R. REP. Nos 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
171. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (3) (A) (1964).
172. S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1958).
173. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1964).
174. 21 U.S.C. § 376(b) (5) (B) (1964).
175. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a) (2) (A), 342(c) (1964). See 21 U.S.C. § 344 (1964).
176. In recent years USDA has handled the problem of "unfavorable" publicity quite
adroitly. Under section 6(e) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 135d(e) (1964), the Secretary is re-
quired to "give notice of all judgments entered in actions instituted under the authority
.. of the act. No notices were published between November, 1964, and December, 1967,
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Thanksgiving that year. The excitement ultimately cost cranberry growers
eight and one-half million dollars, a loss which was later reimbursed by the
government.171
The Delaney amendment hat retained its affinity for controversy. Curi-
ously, of the fourteen Commission recommendations the only one specifically
calling for legislative action is the request for the modification of the Delaney
amendment. The wording of the recommendation is concededly obscure but
appears to invite legislation authorizing the Secretary to establish tolerance
levels for carcinogenic pesticides in food products.178 Secretary Finch has
moved promptly to implement the recommendation, 179 At the outset it is
somewhat surprising that a distinguished Commission on Pesticides and Their
Relationship to Environmental Health would insist so vigorously upon the
revision of legislation plainly intended to protect human health, Little consola-
tion is found in the Commission's defensive claim that the recommendation
"is made in order to permit determinations essential to the protection of
human health, not to justify irresponsible increases in the exposure of the
population to carcinogenic hazards."18 0
Secretary Finch's explanation of this recommendation at his press con-
ference on November 12, 1969,181 borders on the incredible, The nation is
told that "it is important that we interpret the Delaney amendment to the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act specifically as it was enacted. This
amendment requires the removal from interstate commerce of any food additive
shown to be capable of inducing cancer when fed to experimental animals."
In practice, interpreting the Delaney amendment "as it was enacted" means
because the employee who had exercised those responsibilities had retired and was not
replaced. See DEFICIENCIES REFORT at 27.
177. See Whitten Committee Hearings 175-79.
178. The recommendation also can be read as suggesting the abandonment of the
"zero tolerance" notion in favor of a more workable standard of "detectable residues
thought to be pharmacologically insignificant." The latter formulation represents the
FDA's current administrative interpretation of a "zero tolerance." See note 193 infra.
179. HEW Press Release, Dec. 23, 1969.
180. MRAX REPORT 15.
181. To enable us to proceed with this policy of reevaluation it is intportatit that
we interpret the Delaney Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act specifically as it was enacted. This amendment requires the removal from
interstate commerce of any food additive shown to be capable of inducing cancer
when fed to experimental animals. The Delaney Amendment was conceived in
high purpose and has served a useful function. The Department's General Counsel
has pointed out that the Delaney Amendment does not apply to pesticide chemical
residues in raw agricultural commodities or in foods processed from lawful
crops. Nor does it apply to the unavoidable environmental contamination of foods.
The unbelievably sophisticated and sensitive measuring devices now in the
skilled hands of our laboratory technicians can measure one twentieth part of
one unit in a billion. Measurement techniques have improved 1000 fold since the
Delaney Amendment was enacted eleven years ago. If the Delaney Amendment
as it is now written, were to be strictly enforced for pesticide residues it would
Convert us to a nation of vegetarians. Much of our red meat, many dairy product8,
some eggs, fowl and fish-all parts of basic food groups deemed necessary to a
balanced diet-would be outlawed because of very small pesticide residues from
the ecological chain.
Statement of Secretary Robert Finch, Nov. 12, 1969.
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to ignore it altogether; having disregarded the clause, consistency demanded
that the Mrak Commission recommend a revision to foreclose possible future
embarrassment.
B. Application of the Amendment to Pesticide Chemical Residues
Secretary Finch offered two reasons for ignoring the Delaney amend-
ment, one legal, the other scientific, and both untenable. First, the nation is
informed that it is the legal opinion of the General Counsel of HEW that
"the Delaney Amendment does not apply to pesticide chemical residues in raw
agricultural commodities or in foods processed from lawful crops." If the
Delaney amendment is inapplicable, it may be instructive to inquire why the
Commission has recommended modification of the clause. An examination of
the legislation points up the issue. The term "food additive," in pertinent
part, is defined broadly as "any substance the intended use of which results
or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming
a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food (including
any substance intended for use in producing, manufacturing, . . . ,processing,
preparing, [or] treating.., food) .12 Unquestionably, the continued use of
DDT, now widely distributed in the environment, may reasonably be expected
to result in its becoming a component of food products. Stuart Udall has
described the chemical aptly as the "uninvited additive."' 8 3
To be sure, pesticide chemicals, 'in or on a raw agricultural commodity"
or "used in the production" of a raw agricultural commodity are exempted
from the statutory definition of "food additive.' 184 Raw agricultural commodi-
ties elsewhere are defined as "any food in its raw or natural state."'185 More-
over, food processed from a raw agricultural commodity and containing
pesticide residues is not considered adulterated if the residue "has been
removed to the extent possible in good manufacturing practice and the con-
centration of such residue in the processed food when ready to eat is not
greater than the tolerance prescribed for the raw agricultural commodity.'
8 0
Consequently, the General Counsel of HEW is correct in asserting that
"the Delaney Amendment does not apply to pesticide chemical residues in raw
agricultural commodities or in foods processed from lawful crops." But there
is more to the story. The General Counsel should point out also that a pre-
requisite for invocation of this legislative exception is a finding that "the
residue has been removed to the extent possible in good manufacturing prac-
tice." He should acknowledge, in addition, that the Secretary is empowered
182. 21 U.S.C. § 321(5) (1964).
183. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1969, at 30, col. 1.
184.21 U.S.C. §§ 321(a)(1), (2) (1964); see 21 U.S.C. § 321(t)(3) (1964)(extending a similar exception to the definition of "color additive").
185. 21 U.S.C. § 321(r) (1964).
186. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2) (c) ; see United States v. Bodine Produce Co., 206 F.
Supp. 201 (D. Ariz. 1962).
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under the act to establish zero tolerances for pesticide residues "if the scientific
data . . does not justify a greater tolerance ;"187 and that a departmental
regulation declares that a zero tolerance may be established if, among other
reasons, "the chemical is carcinogenic to or has other alarming physiological
effects upon one or more of the species of the test animals used."' 8 Zero
tolerances for heptachlor, aldrin, dieldrin and endrin already have been estab-
lished on several crops. 189 Lastly, he should point out that at the time of the
passage of the Delaney amendment the FDA "had already interpreted the
pesticide-chemicals amendment as barring approval of a residue on food of a
pesticide that causes cancer when fed [to test animals]. '
Thus the decision to disregard the Delaney clause involves something
beyond a mechanical judgment that the proviso does not speak to the problem
of pesticides residues. Indeed, what has happened represents a surprising and
profound departure from the established policy of HEW. By reversing this
long standing policy and ignoring a department regulation, Secretary Finch's
commission has embraced a legal absurdity that would forbid contamination
of our food supply by the deliberate introduction of a carcinogenic "color
additive" or "food additive" used for treatment or processing and yet invite
contamination by an equally toxic pesticide used to enhance production or
appearance. Pesticides in food products, moreover, unlike food additives or
color additives, are unidentified on the product label, denying the consumer
the opportunity to make a judgment about the risk he will confront. The
decision to establish acceptable levels for carcinogenic pesticides generally
distributed in food products is a decision affecting the entire population with-
out regard to the individual's freedom of choice and, on this ground also,
deserves careful scrutiny.191
C. The Scientific Hypothesis
Secretary Finch's scientific argument for ignoring the Delaney amend-
ment is equally deficient. Nothing was said about newly discovered scientific
insights disclosing safe dosage levels for carcinogenic pesticides. Rather, the
public is informed that an improvement in measurement techniques, which
can detect minute amounts of pesticide residues, renders the enforcement of
the Delaney clause a scientific impossibility, because the establishment of zero
tolerance levels "would convert us to a nation of vegetarians. Much of our
187. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1964).
188. 21 C.F.R. § 120.5(b) (1969).
189. See Ribcoff Hearings, pt. 3, at 760-82 (Ex. 65, Discussion of Established
Tolerances for Various Pesticides).
190. FDA Answers to Questions Submitted at Conference Co-sponsored by Ad-
ministration and the FLI [Food Law Institute] at Washington on November 16-17, 1959,
15 FooD DRUG Cosis. L.J. 213, 214 (1960).
191. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) ; Comment, Ftoridation
-Is It Constitutional? No, 24 FORDHA-m L. REv. 657 (1965); Comment, Fluoridation
-Is It Constitutional? Yes, 24 FoR nH. L. Rrv. 674 (1965).
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red meat, many dairy products, some eggs, fowl and fish ... would be out-
lawed." This ad absurdum submission is reminiscent of industry opposition
to the Delaney amendment at the time of its enactment.192 Claims that the
legislation was impossibly stringent were rejected then because the scientific
evidence disclosed that no harmless dose relationships for carcinogens could
be established. Secretary Fleming of HEW, testifying in support of the
amendment, stated, "Our advocacy of the anticancer proviso . . . is based on
the simple fact that no one knows how to set a safe tolerance for substances in
human foods when those substances are known to cause cancer when added to
the diet of animals."' 93 He also said, "No one at this time can tell how much
or how little of a carcinogen would be required to produce cancer in any
human being, or how long it would take the cancer to develop."' 94 This judg-
ment, which was the impulse for the Delaney amendment, is as sound today
as it was when the legislation was enacted.'15 Indeed, the cancer experts on
the Mrak Commission agree that the "argument is indisputable that, despite
our state of ignorance, or even because of it, we ought not to add to the
existing burden of carcinogens, or mutagens, in our environment."'' " The
scientific facts are insidious and sobering: carcinogens have a cumulative
effect; cancers may occur a decade or more after the last known exposure to
the carcinogenic stimulus; significant correlations have been established be-
tween the observation of cancer in man and the induction of tumors in
animals.19 7
It is of course no answer to the claim that safe tolerances for carcinogens
are impossible to say, as has Secretary Finch, that the anti-cancer clauses
should be relaxed because today we are able to detect chemical carcinogens in
the food where before none were observable. Discovering that the risk is
greater than originally perceived is manifestly no reason for abandoning pre-
cautions previously deemed adequate. A reading of the conclusions of the
subcommittee on carcinogenicity discloses a deep concern about the threat to
192. No hearings were held on the Delaney clause in the food additives legislation.
Industry views were articulated at the hearings on the color additives amendment which
are replete with references to the "scientific impossibility" of enforcing this anti-cancer
provision. Hearings on Color Additives Before the House Comm. on Inter-State and
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1960). (Statement of Dr. Thomas Carney,
Eli Lilly & Co.); see id. at 237 (Statement of Kenneth E. Mulford, Manufacturing
Chemists Ass'n, Inc.) ; id. at 309 (Statement of Edward Brown Williams, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Ass'n). Of special interest is the fact that Dr. William J. Darby, Co-
Chairman of the Mrak Commission, testified "that adequate protection would be afforded
by the lav without the inclusion of the Delaney clause." Id. at 468.
193. Id. at 61.
194. H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960) (emphasis in original).
195. See, e.g., MRAx REPORT 262; Gordon, Problems Involved With the Administra-
tion of the Food-Additives Amendment, 15 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.. 777, 785. (1960).
196. MRAX REPORT 262.
197. Ribicoff Hearings, pt. 3, at 676-78, 680-82. (Statement by Dr. Paul J. Kotin,
Associate Director for Field Studies, National Cancer Institute, National Institute of




humati health posed by our present body burdens of DDT. It recommends
that DDT be eliminated in food production; and that contamination of soils
and water be reduced "insofar as possible ;" it concedes only that we should
"not deny a major food need to our country because of the detection of trace
qtantities of DDT resulting from previous use of this pesticide."'918 What is
said falls far short of recommending that the Secretary be given a general
authority to establish tolerance levels for carcinogenic pesticides in food
products.
Until scientists can tell us when an exposure to carcinogens will be
biologically insignificant, it is submitted that Delaney-type prohibitions should
be preserved. Among pesticides, one would suppose that the carcinogens would
be in distinct disfavor. The National Research Council, which has recom-
mended abandoning the zero tolerance concept as administratively and scien-
tifically untenable, also insists that approval of a carcinogenic compound for
use when it might leave a residue on food would require "most extraordinary
justification."'1 9 Citing an improvement in measurement techniques is hardly
such a justification. It would appear, in addition, that the chemical additive
least deserving of exemption from the anti-cancer prohibitions would be the
pesticides. The exposure to the carcinogenic pesticide extends to the entire
consuming public. Other carcinogenic additives of demonstrable value to
human health can be tightly controlled as to the amount of exposure and
the recipient. The risk of cancer associated with the artificial sweetener,
cyclamate, for example, may be more than offset by the advantages gained
from its consumption by diabetics. An HEW Medical Advisory Group on
Cyclamates has preserved this option by recommending that "products con-
taining cyd1amates continue to be made available on advice of a physician to
[diabetes] patients on a non-prescription drug-labelled basis." 20  The Group,
however, "unanimously supports the Secretary's prohibitions of the inclusion
of cyclamates in beverages for general use and in the future processing of
general purpose foods and vegetables."12 0 1 It is an understatement to acknowl-
edge that carcinogenic chemical pesticides appear broadly in "general purpose
foods and vegetables."
One distinct advantage derived from legislation requiring that proven
carcinogens be barred from the food supply is that pressure is exerted upon
industry to develop non-carcinogenic alternatives. 02 The Delaney amendment
unquestionably has stimulated a great deal of important research in the field
198. MRAx REPORT 472.
199. Nat'l Acad. Sciences-Nat'l Research Council, Pesticide Residues Conin. "No
Residue" and "Zero Tolerance," 20 FooD DRuG & CosM. L.J, 608, 614 (1965).
200. HEW Press Release No. 3061 (Nov. 20, 1969) at 2.
201. Id.
202. See Kirk, Food Additives As ]Viewed by the Food and Drug Addnistration,
15 FooD DRUG & Cosm. L.J. 603, 607 (1960).
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of cancer.20 3 The recent restrictions on the use of cyclamates, inspired by the
amendment, already has touched off a competitive struggle to develop and
market non-carcinogenic artificial sweeteners. 04 Relaxing the Delaney amend-
ment would encourage, in many contexts, the familiar refrain of "no acceptable
alternative" which was advanced-and still is reiterated-to justify the con-
tinued use of DDT despite overwhelming scientific opposition.
It is said that distinguishing a pesticide that causes cancer from one that
produces mutations, liver disorders or blood disease is indefensible. 205 Con-
ceivably, of course, different scientific hypotheses apply to different diseases.
Whether acceptable dosage levels can be established for a toxic chemical is
an empirical issue for the scientists. The Commission concedes that the unique
characteristics of cancer justify its "separate consideration." 200 In any event,
consistency is a desirable virtue and can be achieved by extending the prohibi-
tions of the Delaney amendment to pesticides found to be mutagenic, teratono-
genic or, indeed, to all potentially dysbiotic chemicals for which there is no
known safe dosage level. Congressional leaders are considering proposals that
would accomplish these objectives.20 7
D. Cyclamates and Science
Understandably, Secretary Finch is sensitive about the issue of the
Delaney amendment. On October 18, 1969, he announced the removal of
cyclamate from the list of substances recognized as safe for use in foods. 0
He said, "I have acted under the provisions of law because it is imperative
to follow a prudent course in all matters concerning public health ....
Specifically, the so-called Delaney Amendment enacted 11 years ago states
that any food additive must be removed from the market if it has been shown
to cause cancer when fed to humans or animals."2 0 9 Having moved vigorously
to ban cyclamates, once it was established as a carcinogen in animal tests, he
was then confronted with even stronger evidence implicating DDT and several
other pesticides. Members of the Mrak Commission, in preliminary drafts of
the recommendations, conceded that DDT could be banned on the same ratio-
nale that resulted in the elimination of cyclamates. 210 Consistency seemed to
demand strong steps to remove the pesticide from the food supply, for the
203. See Cannon, Scientific Basis for Food Laws, 18 FOOD DRUG & CosmET. L. Rpm.
712, 716 (1963) ; Nat'l Research Council, sipra note 199, at 614.
204. See Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1969, at 1, col. 5 (ban on cyclamates).
205. See Ringuette, Medicated Animal Feeds Under Food-Additives Amendment of
1958: A Case Study, 15 FooD DRUG & Cosu. L.J. 320, 337 (1960) (quoting former FDA
Commissioner George Larrick.)
206. MRAir REPORT 478.
207. See Letter from Senator Gaylord Nelson to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Dec, 18,
1969 (on file with author).
208. Press conference, supra note 14?.
209. Id. at 1-2,
210. Newsday, Oct. 25, 1969, at 10, col 1; see MAx REPORT 472.
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obvious reason that, unlike cyclamates, DDT was a carcinogen that had been
widely distributed in food products. The question was whether a sensible policy
could be reconciled with the Delaney amendment.
To Secretary Finch, the only alternatives were to seize the food or dis-
regard the amendment. There was however a middle-ground that was entirely
consistent with the purpose and language of the anti-cancer clauses. Congress
has informed the Secretary, in no uncertain terms, that the deliberate intro-
duction of carcinogens into the food supply is to be discouraged. It has also
instructed him to insist, as a prerequisite to excepting chemical pesticides from
the anti-cancer clauses, that any residue in food products "[be] removed to the
extent possible in good manufacturing practice"; and to establish zero toler-
ances "if the scientific data does not justify a greater tolerance."21 While the
remedy clearly indicated would have been to establish zero tolerance levels
for DDT in raw agricultural commodities and to seize all food containing
residues of the chemical, this course was foreclosed because of the incredibly
widespread contamination which resulted before responsible agencies and the
general public became aware of the danger.
Under the circumstances, no one would fault the refusal to condemn a
good portion of the nation's food supply. Secretary Finch, though hampered
by the bifurcation of responsibility between FDA and PRD, nevertheless
could have acted decisively to ban DDT. Legally, the action could have been
accomplished most efficiently by PRD immediately suspending all registratiofis
of DDT, a course suggested if not compelled by FIFRA.212 The same result
could have been achieved by FDA publishing a proposed regulation establish-
ing zero tolerances and inviting the submission of scientific data on whether
greater tolerances are justified or exemptions in order.213 A more practical
alternative was for Secretary Finch to initiate discussions with the manufac-
turers of DDT for the purpose of securing their acquiescence in cancellations
affecting agricultural uses. With respect to cyclamates, the Secretary was fully
aware that the power to seize adulterated food a fortiori assumed a power to
cooperate with the manufacturers in securing "orderly withdrawal" of the
products from the marketplace so that they could be "phased out" by
February 1, 1970.214
211. 21 U.S.C. § 321(5) (1964).
212. Under the act all products containing DDT are "misbranded! because injury to
non-target species is caused by use in accordance with commonly accepted practice. See
text accompanying notes 121-24 supra. In addition, the Secretary may "suspend the
registration of an economic poison immediately" when he finds "that such action is neces-
sary to prevent an imminent hazard to the public." 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964): Administra-
tive grounds for finding an "imminent hazard" are established if an economic poison is a
proven carcinogen or is demonstrably injurious to "fish, wildlife and useful animals." 7
C.F.R. § 364.4(c) (1969).
213. "In practice, 'zero tolerance' is interpreted by FDA in some cases to include
a detectable level of residue, lower than that believed to be pharmocologically insignificant."
UsE oF PzsTicmzs 16.
214. Statement by HEW Secretary Robert Finch, October 18, 1969, at 2.
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That the "orderly withdrawal" of DDT from the food supply would take
some 30 or 40 years rather than a few months is no reason for further foot-drag-
ging. Generously construed, the Mrak Commission report and Secretary Finch's
public utterances can be read, in legal terms, as concluding that the "scientific
data" justifies rejection of the zero tolerance notion as impractical and that the
further question of whether "good manufacturing practice" requires the use
of DDT is now being explored by PRD in its rule-making proceeding to
determine "essential" uses. With due regard to the politics of the issue and the
awkward allocation of legislative responsibility, however, it is indisputable that
the action taken falls considerably short of forbidding the future deliberate
lintroduction of a carcinogenic chemical pesticide into the nation's food supply.
PRD's notices of cancellation have had no immediate impact whatsoever on
agricultural uses.215 Long delays may be expected.
The cyclamate-DDT experience is a study in contrasts. Within less than
a month, the Delaney amendment was transformed from the bell weather of
the administration's advance in the field of consumer protection to an archaic
stumbling block to scientific progress. Perhaps the combined influence of the
agri-chemical industry was more influential than the manufacturers of products
containing cyclamates. Perhaps also the dimensions of the DDT issue explain
if not justify the complete abandonment of the legal restraints associated with
the anti-cancer clauses; surely tracking through the legal arguments exposes
the need for concurrent responsibilities over registration. In any event, some
consistency, at least, has been restored in the administration of the law. On
November 20, 1969, acting on the advice of an HEW Medical Advisory
Group on Cyclamates, Secretary Finch softened his statement of October 18,
emphasizing that products containing cyclamates "should continue to be made
available on advice of a physician to [diabetes] patients on a non-prescription
drug-labelled basis." 216 And on December 21, FDA Commissioner Herbert
Ley was fired, reportedly for his inept handling of the cyclamate issue.2 17
E. The Amendment in Perspective
It is one thing to acknowledge that the Delaney amendment has become
unenforcible by fait accompli. It is quite another to suggest, as does the Mralk
Commission, that the legislation be revised to reflect the realities of the situa-
tion. It is difficult to explain the proposed revision of the Delaney amendment
to be anything other than a knee-jerk concession to our present pervasive and
intolerable levels of contamination. In the future, the routine and widespread
use of a carcinogenic pesticide would appear to be an unlikely and undesirable
eventuality. Surely any serious proposals for modifying the Delaney amend-
215. See 34 Fed. Reg. 18827 (Nov. 20, 1969).
216. HEW Press Release No. 3061, (Nov. 20, 1969), at 2.
217. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
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merit nust be documented by demonstrating a need for the future use of
carcipogenic chemical pesticides and establishing that, at certain levels, traces
of this pesticide are biologically insignificant. The argument that "we cannot
condemn all the food" falls far short of establishing the case for modifying
the legislation.
No citizen concerned about DDT should underestimate the value of the
Delaney amendment in this lengthy controversy. In many respects the forces
aligned against DDT and related chemical pesticides were caught in a cruel
dilemma. Overwhelming scientific evidence accumulated over several years
implicated DDT as a worldwide pollutant, having toxic effects on many species
of non-target organisms. But proving that DDT was an environmental con-
taminant failed to irispire corrective action. No stringent legislation-certainly
nothing approaching the Delaney amendment-had been enacted to protect
the fish and the birds.
Small wonder, then, that the leverage afforded by the Delaney amendment,
on the ground of public safety, was fully exploited by frustrated environ-
mentalists. Legal actions were filed challenging the further use of DDT on the
ground that it was a proven carcinogen in animal tests.218 The media stressed
the similarity of the cyclamate and DDT issues.219 The Delaney amendment
was clear and specific, comprehensible to the public at large and, it is sub-
mitted, highly influential in the deliberations of the commission, 2 0 It afforded
the extreme advantage of a per e analysis: if the cancer studies are scientific-
ally sound, the legal consequence is flatly ordained.
The particulars of the anti-cancer clause therefore may afford a welcome
avenue for exerting pressure, legal and otherwise, an the policy choices of a
public agency. The necessity to control the exercise of administrative discretion
is an issue receiving much attention of late,221 The consequences for environ-
mental law are considerable. That the agencies have not been doing the job
is all too obvious. The highway builders, urban planners and dredgers working
for the government too often have destroyed our natural resources with dis-
patch, vigor and incredible shortsightedness.222 The new breed of bureaucrats
218. Rodgers v. Finch, Civ. No. 25,385, filed by the author in the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals on Jan. 30, 1970; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Finch, Civ. No. 23,812,
filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on Dec. 30, 1969. Both petitions
seek review of similar orders, signed by FDA Commissioner Ley on Dec. 8, dismissing
pesticide petitions requesting that zero tolerances be established for residues of DDT on
raw agricultural commodities. The Rodgers petition has been stayed, by order dated
April 1, 1970, until judgment in the Environmental Defense Fund action "has become
final." See N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1969, at 30, col. 1, describing a petition filed with USDA
by the Environmental Defense Fund and others requesting the immediate cancellation of
the registration of all pesticide products containing DDT.
219. E.g., Green, The Politics of Pesticides, THE NATION, Nov. 24, 1969, at 569;
TrE, Nov. 21, 169, at 59.
220. See note 210 supra.
221. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DlscanmoiaTY JusTicE (1969); Peck, A Critique of the
NLRB's Performance in Policy Forinalion: Adjudication and Rule Making, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 254 (1968).
222. See Baldwin, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, note g5 supra; Green, The Role of
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in the fields of air, water and solid waste pollution already have demonstrated
their ability to postpone decisions that cannot and should not be postponed ;223
the tendency for the pleasant arrangement between the regulator and the
regulated is often at the expense of the public. Deservedly, agencies are appear-
ing increasingly as named defendants in legal actions initiated by citizens
concerned about protecting the environment.2 24
The failures of the administrative agency are among the most important
of public law questions today. Institutionalizing the administrative critic is
a notion that is becoming widely accepted and deserving of further refinement.
The recommendations of the Mrak Commission are but one form of extra-
governmental contributions that are urgently needed. Across the country
scientists are organizing to put a halt to the degradation of the environment
caused by industry irresponsibility and governmental foot-dragging.225 Direct-
ing this wealth of talent through legal channels is the responsibility of the
lawyer. The strength of the Delaney amendment, not apparent to most ob-
servers, is that it sharply confined administrative discretion in an atea where
officials for years had been dead wrong and legally vulnerable. No single
piece of legislation was more responsible for the success of the assault against
the persistent pesticides. Acquiescing in its modification would amount to a
mistaken concession to an intoletant industry and an embarrasser government.
IV. ENCOURAGE VARIOUS INITIATIVES TO PREVENT FURTHER
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION BY PESTICIDE RESIDUES
Recommendation X. Increase federal support of research in all
methods of pest contr ol, the effects of pesticides on human health and
on the ecosystemts, and on improved techniques for prediction of
human effects.
Recommendation XI. Provide incentives to industry to encourage
the development of more specific pest control chemicals,
Like many of the other recommendations, this clarion call for additional
research sounds a refrain that is distressingly familiar in the pesticides field.
Ten years ago another commission headed by Dr. Mrak recommended that
"[r]esearch should be intensified in all areas pertaining to the use, toxicology
and effects on health of agricultural chemicals and in finding better pest
Government in Environmental Conflict, Conference on Law and the Environment (un-
published paper on file at the Conservation Foundation, Sept. 1969, Wash., D.C.); Wall
St. J., Jan. 6, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
223. See Green, supra note 222.
224. See note 218 supra for a few instances among many.
225. See B. COMMONER, SCMNCE AND SiuRviVAL 110-20 (1966), for a discussion of the
St. Louis Committee for Nuclear Information, which since 1958 has pioneered ih public
education about the scientific aspects of public affairs. The Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. which has spearheaded the assault against the persistent pesticides, gains support
for its actions through its Scientists Advisory Committee, which includes more than 200
scientists ;Who serve without fee. See Press Release, The Environmental Defense Fund




control measures. The research should include not only development of safer
pesticides and more efficient methods of analysis, but also alternative measures
such as biological control and the development of pest-resistant varieties of
crops."22 6 Expanded research needs were identified by the President's Science
Advisory Committee in 1963,227 and again in 1965,228 and have been stressed
in every major study since then.229 Recommending the development of non-
persistent alternatives has been a consistent theme.230 The Mrak Report now
adds a plea for incentives to the past calls for cooperation. The Commission's
thorough review of the scientific literature highlighting the gaps in our
knowledge demonstrates that additional research needs are urgent and ir-
refutable.2 31 Time and again the Commission stresses our fundamental areas
of ignorance about the effects of pesticides on man and his" environment. 2 2
Without a doubt, the risks of this new technology are still largely obscure.2 8
Choices are inevitably necessary in allocating funds between private in-
dustry and governmental agencies and in identifying priorities. The develop-
ment of selective non-persistent chemicals is obviously crucial. The President's
Science Advisory Committee has concluded that this research ability is well
within the capacity of the pesticides industry. Similarly, industry is on
record as being opposed to expanded governmental research to discover safer
pesticides since it not only "puts the government in direct competition with
industry, which will tend to reduce the amount of industrial research.., but
implies that industry is not bending every effort to find safer and more effective
chemicals toward these ends."234
Whether or not industry is "bending every effort" its unwillingness or
inability to develop safer, less persistent chemicals is indisputable. The Com-
mission properly points out that "developmental costs will be disproportionately
high in relation to profits from the lower volume of sales of more specific
226. GovERxoa EDM~uND G. BRowN's SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC POLICY
REGARDING AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS, REPORT 9-10 (1960).
227. USE OF PESTIcIDES 21.
228. U.S. PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY Comm., ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PANEL,
RESTORING THE QUALITY or OUR ENVmONMENT 268 (1965).
229. E.g., Ribicoff Report 68; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE-NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, INSECT-PEST MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 499-500 (1969); JENsEN
REPORT 29-30.
230. See, e.g., note 226 supra; USE or PESTICIDES 20 ("Elimination of the use of
persistent toxic pesticides should be the goal").
231. See MRAc REPORT, passim.
232. The Commission identified an "urgent need" to investigate the implications that
DDT interferes with photosynthesis in phytoplankton (p. 207). The Mrak Report points
out "important gaps in our knowledge of the storage, metabolism and significance of DDT
in human tissues" (p. 255) ; and that the "threshold dose" of DDT for induction of meta-
bolizing enzymes in human liver is "unknown" (p. 235).
233. Although genetic damage is "irreversible by any process we now know," the
Commission concludes that none of the pesticides have been tested properly for possible
mutagenic effects (pp. 571-72).
234. Gordon, Problems Involved With the Administration of the Food Additives
Amendment, 15 FooD DRUG & COSM. L.J. 777, 783 (1960) (the author is the dircctor of
Research, Agricultural Chemicals Division, Monsanto Chemical Company).
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chemicals which will be used selectively. '"2 3 5 Additional funding of govern-
mental research may be necessary. Another method for channeling research
towards the development of acceptable alternatives is through legal coercion
against the use of certain chemicals; the approach of the Delaney amendment
is indispensible. Industry incentives and direct subsidies also are an integral
part of a sensible policy aimed at controlling chemical pesticides. That cleaning
up pollution will cost money is not at issue.
A necessary corollary of both public and private research is to require
publication of the findings. Free dissemination of knowledge is the first principle
of scientific research. Today, political realities trench hard upon the full
realization of this principle. Reasons of national security interfere with the
publication of research of crucial importance to decisions affecting the environ-
ment. "Secrecy has deprived us, for example, of the knowledge that might have
warned us in time that nuclear explosions are biologically risky, and, when
carried out at high altitudes, can obscure for a long time what we want to
learn about the newly discovered bands of atomic particles which surround
the earth.1238 Industrial competition similarly works to inhibit the free dis-
semination of research about environmental hazards of chemical pesticides. A
recent survey of the toxicological effects of weed killers commenced with this
disclaimer: "Many of the toxicological data underlying assessment of the risks
involved by using [weed killers] in practice originate from confidential, non-
published reports placed at the disposal of the authorities concerned. Such
data have not been included in the present survey. 23 7 Complaints have been
made about the difficulty in securing experimental results, crucial to the deter-
mination, of the propriety of registering a particular chemical, from both the
industry, PRD and FDA as well.238 The Mrak Commission noted, "Un-
published reports in the files of industry and of Federal regulatory agencies
are less accessible than the general scientific literature."23 9 In the cyclamates
controversy, at least one of the scientists engaged in the research felt con-
strained to go directly to the media with his data because of apparent concern
about foot-dragging within the agency.240 Legislation, which has been de-
servedly criticized, 241 specifically forbids disclosure of the data submitted in
support of a tolerance application until the publication of a regulation, thus
foreclosing contributions by disinterested outsiders.
In some respects, government-sponsored research led to the development
of DDT as part of our war policy and, indirectly, to the great expansion of
235. MRAK REPORT 17.
236. B. COmmoNER, ScIENcE AND SuRvivAL 55 (1966).
237. Dalgaard-Mikkelsen & Poulson, Toxicology of Herbicides, 14 PHARMACOLOGICAL
REv. 225 (1962).
238. Ribicoff Hearings 694-95, 703 (Testimony of Dr. Wilhelm C. Hueper, National
Cancer Institute, National Institute of Health).
239. MRAE: REPORT 462.
240. Press conference, supra note 142, at 20, 25, 29-31.
241. See USE OF PESTICms 17.
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the chemical pesticides industry. Perhaps this government support "provided
a twenty-year headstart for this one pesticide, and acted as a quasi-official
restraint on trade and technological innovation by inhibiting . . . investment
in chemicals that would be more specific in their action and less subject to
cycling and magnification in nature."2 42 Long overdue is action by the govern-
ment to reorder priorities on research in the pesticides field and to insist upon
disclosure of information that will redound to the benefit of the public.
Recommendation XIV. Increase participation in international
cooperative efforts to promote safe and effective usage of pesticides.
Tackling a worldwide pollution problem on an international basis is a
commendable objective. No figures are available on the world production or
use of the persistent pesticides.2 43 It is clear, however, that American industry
is the prime producer of the world's supply of chemical pesticides 244 It is
equally clear that the recent restrictions on domestic usage will not result in
limitations on exports. The amount of DDT used abroad is increasing rapidly
and projections confirm the trend.2 45
The Commission's view that the United States government should assume
leadership deserves emphasis. Credit for many of the gains realized through
the widespread use of pesticides as well as responsibility for the damage in-
flicted rests squarely upon the technological elite of American industry and
governmental officials charged with regulating it. Even today, sales of DDT
and related chemicals are being promoted abroad by United States industry and
agencies, such as AID and the Department of Defense.240 There is no question
that, in this regard, the world will buy what America sells.
Optimistically, a renewed research commitment inspired by the Mrak
Commission will result in the transmission of information throughout the
world to halt and reverse the process of environmental degradation attributable
to widespread use of the persistent pesticides. The Environmental Quality
Council of the Office of the President already has taken the commendable
step of pursuing the use of multilateral channels, including the UN, specialized
agencies and regional organizations to facilitate the exchange of information
and technical assistance.2 47 The early period of chemical conquest is drawing to
a close. Worldwide environmental degradation must be contained and the
process of reclamation initiated. To secure these goals, international coopera-
tion obviously is essential.
Recommendation XII. Review and consider the adequacy of
242. Clement, The Pesticide Problem, 8 NAT. RES. J. 11, 21-22 (1968).
243. JENSEN CommITTEE REPORT 7.
244. See MpA.xi REPoRT 47.
245. See id. at 55-56.
246. See id. at 49-51.
247. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, EnvironmentalQuality Council, Nov. 20, 1969, at 2.
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legislation and regulation designed to [improve advertising, labeling,
packaging, disposal, indemnification and other miscellaneous re-forms].
It is impossible to respond, within limited space, to this series of recom-
mendations that deal in shotgun fashion with the glaring inadequacies in
present regulations governing the sale, use and disposal of chemical pesticides.
Perhaps articulating the issues is a sine qua non to enforcing reform. No one
would quarrel with the Commission's observation that "[a ] dvertising inconsis-
tent with the label should be prohibited."248 Fraud should be discouraged. On
the other hand, absent reference to specific deficiencies in enforcement policies
and legislative weaknesses, precatory exhortations against wrongdoing are
unlikely to result in meaningful initiatives.
The Commission's treatment of labeling is illustrative. Plainly, once a
pesticide is registered, regulatory efforts are greatly dependent upon the ef-
ficacy of the label and the instructions. Given the deficiencies in the registration
process, labeling as an instrument of control becomes crucial to the effective
regulation of pesticides. What is required is an accurate label, an ability to
comprehend the label by the user and an inclination to obey what was under-
stood. Predictably, the labeling line of defense against pesticide misuse is erratic
at best.
A reading of many pesticides labels would afford excellent clinical ex-
perience for a course in consumer fraud. "This material is sold without war-
ranty as to hazards or results" reads the modest disclaimer on the label of
Ortho Rose Dust, manufactured by California Spray-Chemical Corporation.
A pesticide is misbranded if when used as directed or in accordance with
commonly recognized practice it is injurious to man or other vertebrates.2 4
Suffice it to say, that among other legalities, the continued use of several
of the chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides plainly offends the labelirig pro-
visions of FIFRA. The House Committee on Government Operations sup-
plies another classic instance of faulty labeling :250 the label for a concentrated
fly and roach spray had been approved for registration by PRD although
it bore obviously contradictory warnings. The warning notice alerts the user
to:
Use in well ventilated rooms or areas only. Always spray away from
you. Do not stay in room that has been heavily treated. Avoid
inhalation.
The directions for use tell a different story:
Close all doors, windows and transoms. Spray with a fine mist sprayer
upwards in all directions so the room is filled with the vapor. If the
248. MRAi REPORT 17.
249. 7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) (g) (1964).
250. DEmaciEsci RmORT 45.
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insects have not dropped to the floor in 3 minutes repeat spraying,
as quantity sprayed was insufficient. After 10 minutes doors and
windows may be opened.
The Commission renders valuable though obvious advice by pointing out that
effective labeling practices and instructions "require use of common (generic)
names for all pesticides, and the conveying of clear directions for and informa-
tion about proper use, dangers, and first-aid. Printing should be readable and
multilingual when that is appropriate."25' But an across-the-board recom-
mendation to correct all glaring deficiencies begs many policy questions.252
Empirically, the primary issue is whether the label and instructions are
likely to influence the conduct of the user. A suspicion would be that few users,
especially among the homeowners, are likely to read the label. Those who do
will disregard it. Why not double or triple the recommended dosage or
frequency of application in order to assure the annihilation of the intended
target? Reportedly, one grower who had spread heptachlor epoxide on his
turkey range to control chiggers despite label warnings that it could harm
livestock responded, "Hell, I ain't raising livestock. I'm raising turkeys." 25 3
After operating on implicit assumptions about the reliability of labels for
a number of years, PRD recently has invested $52,000 with the University
of Illinois to determine the accuracy of the universal hunch that nobody reads
the label.254 According to a recent report of the project investigators, a
review of the literature confirmed "that most of the pesticide users do not read
pesticide labels" and, moreover, "users find it difficult to understand pesticide
labels when they read them."2 55 Not surprisingly, labeling reform will provide
no protection against environmental and personal mishaps caused by chemicals
that never should have been made available in the first place. Improved
instructions are an illustory gesture. It is hoped that the recent actions with-
drawing DDT from general use will be duplicated with respect to many other
pesticides consistent with the recommendations of the Mrak Commission.
The notion of controlled use has been dogma in the pesticides field for
time immemorial. The Ribicoff Committee was told by USDA that pesticide
users have been receiving 3 million reminders a year to "[r] ead the label and
251. MRAx REPoRT 18. The Ribicoff Committee uncovered evidence that Mexican-
American farm workers suffered inordinately from acute poisoning episodes because of an
inability to comprehend labels written in English. See Ribicoff Hearings 623. (Ex. 50,
Occupational Disease in California Attributed to Pesticides and Other Agricultural
Chemicals).
252. Writing a label for DDT is a challenge not easily met: POISON. This pesticide
is highly toxic to non-target species, notably marine organisms and many species of bird
life. Interferes with photosynthesis in marine plankton. Causes cancer in test animals. Is
persistent and mobile and is distributed throughout the world's water and air supply.
May be ingested by man through the air he breathes, through his skin and his food supply.
Tends to concentrate in fatty tissues but at levels that may be biologically insignificant.
253. Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1969, at 4, col. 2.




follow the instructions,1 256 a precaution of doubtful value since nobody reads
the label or follows the instructions. For years nutritionists, entomologists and
agriculturalists have been insisting that careful, informed use rather than a
complete ban was the solution to the problem of persisting residues in the
environment. Dr. William J. Darby, co-chairman of the Mrak Commission,
testified in 1966 that the President's Science Advisory Committee's recom-
mendation to eliminate the use of the persistent pesticides was mistaken. In
his view the devotion of greater resources "toward education of those who are
responsible and those who are using pesticides will accomplish much more in
reducing the hazards than will legislative restrictions. '257 On October 23, 1969,
Secretary of Agriculture Hardin issued a statement urging "all users of pesti-
cides.., to heed label directions and exercise constant care in ... . application,
storage and disposal." 258 Notions of controlled use are manifested in regula-
tions forbidding spraying in dust form,2 59 which poses unique drift problems
and in requirements that applicators be licensed. The Mrak Commission's
recommendations to allow certain uses only upon permit reflect a similar line
of thinking.260 The cancellation of registrations for certain DDT uses but not
others-currently underway in several states and at the federal level-shows
a similar inclination to place reliance upon use restrictions.
This is not to say that efforts to educate the public, control pesticide
usage, license applicators and advise against improper applications are mis-
taken. Regulation must run the gamut. The DDT dispute no doubt has its
parallels in public discussions about controlling hand guns, bulldozers, atomic
bombs, or any other type of dangerous instrumentality. Regulation may range
from education to licensing users to restricting use in confined areas by certain
persons or to an outright ban. Those being regulated customarily opt for the
lesser form of restriction.
As to the persistent pesticides, however, notions of controlled usage have
been thoroughly discredited. The chemical's mobility, stability and solubility
assure an escape beyond the area of application and its accumulation in bio-
logical organisms. Trace amounts in the environment build to dangerous
levels through the process of biological concentration. While ignorance, reck-
lessness and greed have contributed to the environmental catastrophe we now
confront, the consequences were predictable when these compounds were first
introduced into general use.
Recommendation XIII. Develop, in consultation with the Council
of State Governments, model regulations for the collection and dis-
posal of unused pesticides, used containers, and other pesticide con-
tantinated materials.
256. Ribicoff Hearings 723.
257. Id. at 659.
258. Secretary's Memo No. 1666, USDA Policy on Pesticides, Oct. 23, 1969, at 2.
259. E.g., 3 CA.. An nx. CODE § 2408(b) (regulations); see MRAEX REjoRT 115.
260. MRAX REPoRT 13.
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This recommendation is a necessary concession to the present precarious
state of affairs. Disposing of "unused pesticides" requires careful regulation
for the simple reason that there now exists, widely distributed among the
population, a deadly supply of chemicals which should never be released into
the environment. The great danger, of course, is that the alarmed housewife
will deposit her entire supply of chemicals into the drainage system where it
can do the most harm. Commendably, states which have acted to restrict the
use of the persistent pesticides have accompanied these announced cutbacks
with instructions on disposal. 261 Officials have collected existing suppliers and
have publicized the availability of their services.26 2 Generally, the homeowner
is advised to bury his DDT products at places far removed from water
sources.268 This represents an advance in thinking over the advice currently
dispensed by the USDA which instructs the user to "wrap empty containers
or those unwanted pesticides in heavy layers of newspapers and promptly put
them in the trash can." 264
The leisurely development of model regulations is insufficient to meet the
present emergency. Informing the public about methods of proper disposal is
essential and urgent. Before the model regulations are developed, HEW and
USDA, in cooperation with state officials, should take steps forthwith to
inform the public about methods of disposal that would be least damaging to
the environment.
Perhaps the American technology that created the disaster will come to
the rescue. Existing knowledge "confirms the feasibility of inducing active
withdrawal of pesticide residues from the human body" although further
research is needed.260 HEW reports significant progress under a research
contract to develop a process that would break down more rapidly several
of the persistent pesticides.266 The residues may be eliminated but the problems
of coping with modern technology remain.
CONCLUSION
That we have entered a new world of technology is evident everywhere
about us, Modern man is living in a "new kind of environment" which has
been largely created in the "incredibly short" time of twenty years. In this
brief period, "at least half a million new chemical compounds have come into
261. See Cooperative Extension Service, Mich. State University, How to Dispose of
DDT, Extension Bull. E-664 (Aug. 1969); Press Release, Agricultural Extension
Service, Washington State University, Dec. 26, 1969.
262. See Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 20, 1969, at 13, Col. 1.
263. See note 261 supra.
264. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF INFORMATION, FACTS ABOTUT PEST CONTROL:
YOUR HoME & SAFE UsE OF PEsncms (Dec. 1967).
265. MpAK REPORT 36,
266. See 2 CCH C.EAN AIR & WATgR NEws 15 (1970).
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existence."2 6 7 The issue of the persistent pesticides is not whether the chemical
revolution in the control of pests has proven useful. Technology in agriculture,
as elsewhere, is the key to our way of life. But our miracle innovations must
be made to serve the ends of civilization rather than subvert them. The
story of DDT is a story of uncontrolled experimentation with the world's
population and environment. The vehicle for protecting us from ourselves-the
law-was tried and found wanting. The Mrak Commission has told us that
much and a great deal more. Whether that vehicle will be repaired for the
voyage ahead is currently being debated. Certainly no goal surpasses in im-
portance the need to prevent man from harming, abusing or destroying himself
and his environment. No one is immune from the challenge nor secure from
the consequences of failure.
267. Ribicoff Hearings 832 (quoting Luther L. Terry, former Surgeon Gtnekal of the
United States).
